TS::SCI::HUMINT LEAD PACKET - SULTANS WRATH::TS::SCI - June 26th, 2025

[SSgt Waller]

HUMINT LEAD PACKET — SULTANS WRATH (Derived from D-01 / D-02)

Classification: SECRET – Operational Use Only
Date: June 26, 2025
Prepared by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence HET / Intel Cell

---

1) Executive Summary

Two detainees provided partial, evasive testimony. Key HUMINT leads: (1) an operational commander known as “Youssef,” (2) a probable insider leak in Laayoune, (3) foreign-sourced explosives (Russian/Cyrillic packaging), and (4) persistent rumors that Youssef once trained with U.S. forces during an exchange/liaison program while serving in the Algerian army. This last point, while unverified, could explain his familiarity with U.S. convoy doctrine and counter-ambush drills.

---

2) Source Reliability & Assessment

• D-01 (25–30, low-level fighter): Low reliability; evasive, confrontational, ideological focus. Provided general admissions (wall charges, ambush structure) but no specifics.

• D-02 (35–40, senior fighter/driver): Medium reliability; combative but more informative. Confirmed “Youssef” as commander, referenced foreign-sourced explosives, alluded to IMET/TSCTP training.

Both detainees corroborate:

• Ambush executed with professional-level discipline.

• Familiarity with U.S. convoy tactics.

• Ideological framing of U.S. as enabling Moroccan suppression of Sahrawi people.

---

3) Key HUMINT Leads

1. “Youssef” — Ambush Commander

   • Nom de guerre; reportedly ex-Algerian army officer.

   • Detainees allege exposure to U.S.-funded training programs (possibly IMET, TSCTP).

   • Tactical impact: likely source of OPFOR knowledge of herringbone dispersal and convoy SOP exploitation.

   • Priority: High — identification, service history, training records verification.

2. Insider leak — Laayoune

   • Both detainees claim Moroccan officials compromised convoy route.

   • Priority: High — CI investigation to identify personnel with access to ministerial movement data.

3. Explosives & logistics

   • Wall charges of probable foreign origin (Russian/Cyrillic markings).

   • Priority: Medium — forensic analysis, trace supply networks.

4. Ideological motivation & propaganda

   • Detainees frame U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression.

   • Use of interrogations to reinforce narrative of righteous struggle.

   • Priority: Medium — assess messaging impact on local recruitment or morale.

5. OPFOR tactics & discipline

   • Execution of L-shaped ambush, coordinated flanking, timed withdrawal demonstrates high-level tactical proficiency.

   • Priority: Medium — assess training source, replication risk, countermeasures.

---

4) Corroboration & Collection Requirements

• CI / HUMINT:

  • Confirm “Youssef” identity and IMET/TSCTP training participation.

  • Investigate Laayoune administrative leak — transport/protocol offices.

  • Interview refugee camp sources for confirmation of leadership identity and prior Algerian service.

• Forensics / Technical Exploitation:

  • Examine wall charges and blast residue for origin and supply-chain links.

• SIGINT / IMINT:

  • Review communications around Smara ambush.

  • Monitor suspected staging areas, safehouses, and vehicle movements.

• Open-source / Liaison:

  • Check IMET / TSCTP training rosters (2000–2015) for Algerian officers matching “Youssef.”

  • Leverage partner intelligence for corroboration without tipping detainee-derived leads.

---

5) Analyst Comment

The detainees’ combative and ideological framing indicates OPFOR confidence and attempts to psychologically challenge U.S. moral authority.

• The rumor of U.S. training (IMET/TSCTP) is consistent with historical programs and could explain the precision exploitation of U.S. convoy SOPs.

• Insider leaks from Laayoune remain a probable operational vulnerability.

• OPFOR demonstrates professional-level small-unit tactics, suggesting foreign or institutional training exposure.

Counterintelligence priority: Confirm “Youssef” identity and training background; neutralize leadership node to disrupt operational cohesion.

---

6) Immediate Recommendations

1. Re-interrogate D-02 to focus specifically on:

   • IMET/TSCTP training timeline and Youssef’s role in Algerian military.

   • Names, locations, or facilitators of Laayoune leaks.

2. Forensic / SIGINT coordination: Trace explosives, validate supply lines, monitor communications.

3. CI Measures: Audit Moroccan channels for potential insider leaks; implement protective protocols for convoy planning.

4. Source Development: Expand HUMINT coverage in refugee camps and local populations to corroborate leadership structure and past foreign exposure.

---

7) Risk Assessment

• Operational Security: OPFOR has high situational awareness and is ideologically motivated; detainee compartmentalization likely protects leadership.

• Counterintelligence Exposure: IMET/TSCTP alumni could represent doctrinal vulnerability if confirmed.

• Psychological Influence: Detainees actively seek to frame U.S. involvement as morally compromised, potentially affecting local perception and recruitment.