SSgt Waller

Mr. Cheng, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation for the team you wish to join. You will be attached to the headquarters element and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If the Team HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Private. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Dauby Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation for the team you wish to join. You will be attached to the headquarters element and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If the Team HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Private. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Parker, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation with the 160th SOAR. You will be attached to aviation headquarters and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If Aviation HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Warrant Officer Candidate. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Tongate Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation for the team you wish to join. You will be attached to the headquarters element and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If the Team HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Private. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Schnoor, Your application has been accepted. Since you are a returning member of this Unit, you are being placed in reserves where you are free to transfer to an available billet at your discretion. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Tongate, Before we can process this application, it is required to provide a valid Steam Profile Link. This can be found at the top of your steam program by clicking on (your steam username), going down to profile then copy and paste the URL located under the tabs (Store, Library, Community, (your steam name here.)) Once you have found your Steam Profile Link, please update your application with the proper Link, and post a reply in the topic in order to make the Recruiters aware of the update. We will process this application as soon as possible. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

The Mahgreb Morass: A Border on the Brink Tensions across the Maghreb have sharpened following an incident that risks unravelling the region’s fragile balance. Earlier this week, United States special operations forces supporting Moroccan units in Western Sahara shot down an Algerian MiG-29 Fulcrum during an engagement with Polisario Front fighters. It is the most serious escalation since Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory earlier this year. Algeria has insisted the aircraft was on a routine training sortie and inadvertently crossed the border due to a navigational error. Rabat, by contrast, has condemned what it describes as a “flagrant violation” of Moroccan airspace and views the incident as further evidence of Algerian brinkmanship. Moroccan officials are reportedly observing a steady build-up of Algerian forces along the frontier with growing unease. Leaked picture of Morroccan investigators at the crash site. An older MIG-29 Fulcrum is valued at 5-10 million dollars depending on variant. For Washington, the downing of the MiG places its limited but sensitive deployment in an awkward position. What was intended as a counter-insurgency support mission has edged towards direct confrontation, blurring the line between tactical assistance and overt participation in a regional conflict. While American defence officials maintain that the engagement was purely defensive, the optics of a U.S. unit bringing down an Algerian aircraft could reverberate far beyond the Sahara. In Europe, the response has been cautious but telling. France — still diplomatically entwined with its former North African colonies and mindful of its own domestic constituencies — has revised its travel advisories, warning citizens against travel to both Morocco and Algeria. The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs cited “heightened regional tensions and unpredictable security conditions” as grounds for the update. The Western Sahara question, long relegated to the margins of post-colonial diplomacy, has returned as a flashpoint where old rivalries and new alliances intersect. The downing of a single aircraft has reminded all parties how swiftly the Maghreb’s latent hostilities can ignite — and how easily outside powers can find themselves drawn into the desert’s dangerous geometry.

Collateral Damage in the Desert: Civilians Pay the Price of America’s War The smoke had barely cleared when villagers near Mheiriz discovered the bodies. Among them were men known not as fighters, but as farmers — unarmed, caught in the blast radius of what locals insist was an American airstrike. Grain sacks lay scattered among the rubble, a bitter symbol of lives cut short while tending the land. In the dusty market square, grief turned to anger. Only hours earlier, American troops operating under the banner of “counter-insurgency” demolished a local shop said to have been frequented by ordinary families. Residents describe it as nothing more than a place to buy bread, oil, and tea. Its blackened walls now stand as stark testimony to what they call the indifference of foreign soldiers toward Sahrawi lives. A typical local market in western sahara For the Polisario Front, these incidents are not isolated accidents. They are the predictable outcome of a campaign that labels resistance as terrorism and dismisses local suffering as the price of “stability.” “Every bomb dropped, every shop destroyed, every farmer killed — it only proves what we have always said,” a Polisario representative in Tindouf declared. “The United States fights not for peace, but to keep Morocco’s grip on our homeland.” Washington insists its operations target armed insurgents, not civilians. But on the ground, the distinction is lost in the dust. For the families burying their dead, the argument rings hollow. In refugee camps and villages alike, the message spreads: America has chosen sides, and the Sahrawi people — once promised self-determination — are now treated as collateral in someone else’s war. As images of shattered fields and ruined storefronts circulate online, the Polisario claims momentum not from battlefield victories alone, but from what they see as growing proof that U.S. intervention deepens, rather than resolves, the suffering in Western Sahara.

Ghosts of Old Wars: The Mystery of Weapons in Western Sahara On a wind-scoured plain south of Smara, Moroccan soldiers and U.S. advisors sifted through the aftermath of battle. The air still carried the acrid scent of explosives, the sand pocked with shell casings and burn marks. But what drew the most attention were the weapons seized in the operations. Among the battered rifles and empty cartridges were relics of another era: shoulder-fired Igla missiles and mid-caliber mortars, the kind once standard in Algerian arsenals. The discovery has sparked a familiar round of accusations and denials, highlighting how even in a decades-old conflict, every weapon can become a political statement. Moroccan security officials, speaking off the record, claim the arms are proof of Algerian complicity. “This level of planning, this firepower — it didn’t come out of thin air,” said one senior officer. “Someone gave them the tools to hit us this hard.” Algeria, as ever, sees things differently. In a curtly worded communiqué, its Foreign Ministry dismissed the allegations as scapegoating. “Anyone familiar with the Sahara knows these deserts are littered with remnants of past conflicts. Old arms circulate for decades on the black market. Algeria cannot be blamed for every loose round that turns up,” the statement read. Italian troops training with mortars The truth, as so often in the Western Sahara, is elusive. The Igla and mortar systems recovered could indeed be traced back to Algerian stocks — or they might have been stolen long ago, diverted in transit, or sold quietly by middlemen in a region where smuggling is as old as the caravan routes themselves. For Washington, the find is awkward. U.S. forces have deepened their counterinsurgency role in the region, presenting Morocco as a bulwark against jihadist chaos in the Sahel. Yet every new weapon seized raises the specter of escalation between Rabat and Algiers — a rivalry that has already frozen the Maghreb into two armed camps. European diplomats, meanwhile, worry aloud about the knock-on effects for energy supplies, migration policy, and Mediterranean stability. At the heart of it all, as always, are the Sahrawi. For fighters in the Polisario Front, old weapons are less symbols than lifelines, proof that their long-buried cause is not yet forgotten. For the thousands still stranded in the camps of Tindouf, the reappearance of Cold War–era arms is another reminder that their struggle has become hostage to the shifting interests of larger powers. The Igla tubes recovered in Smara are more than artifacts; they are echoes. They carry with them the ghosts of old wars, now pulled into the light of a new one. Whether they prove Algerian involvement or simply the resilience of desert smuggling networks, they are already reshaping the narrative — sharpening suspicions, hardening rivalries, and reminding the world that in Western Sahara, nothing stays buried forever. The truth always surfaces sooner or later. The IGLA is a shoulder-fired 72 mm surface-to-air missile launcher. More troubling still are recent, unverified leaks suggesting an attempt to supply the insurgents with much more than mortar tubes and rifles: night-vision goggles and an unknown number of armored personnel carriers of soviet-BTR type were allegedly handed over. If true, that would mark a significant change in intent and capability — NVG suites would extend the fighters’ operational window and precision, while armored vehicles would multiply their mobility and protection. But the caveat is essential: these claims could not be independently confirmed, and officials caution they may reflect rumor, disinformation, or loose talk among intermediaries. For now, the story of the Igla and the mortars remains evidence; the rest is a shadowed allegation that, if proven, would raise the stakes dramatically. Russian BTR on a training exercise in 2020 Revue Diplomatique Rachid Benyamina – North Africa and Sahel specialist

U.S. Helicopters Downed in Western Sahara The desert sky over Western Sahara lit up with fire this week, as reports confirmed that U.S. helicopters operating near Smara were brought down during counterinsurgency missions. Grainy footage of smoldering wreckage has already surfaced online, eagerly circulated by insurgent channels — but American officials stress that the full picture is far more complex, and far less conclusive. Details remain scarce. Washington has not confirmed the status of the aircrews, citing ongoing recovery operations and the need to safeguard sensitive information. What is clear is that U.S. and Moroccan forces moved swiftly to contain the situation, with rapid reaction elements deployed to secure crash zones and prevent further exploitation. “We will not speculate while operations are ongoing,” said one Pentagon spokesperson, “but we are committed to the safety of our personnel and the mission at hand.” A UH-60 Blackhawk and it's crew on a training flight Analysts suggest the helicopters were likely targeted by legacy man-portable air defense systems — Igla variants dating back to Cold War stockpiles. If true, it would underscore both the persistence of old weapons in the Sahara’s black markets and the sophistication of insurgents who can still wield them effectively. Despite the uncertainty, pentagon officials have struck a steady tone, framing the incident as evidence of why American involvement matters. “These attacks are meant to intimidate,” one defense official noted, “but they will only strengthen our resolve to stand with Morocco against destabilizing forces.” For the fighters who posted triumphant images of the wreckage online, the message was clear: they wanted the world to see America humbled in the desert. But for U.S. forces, the story is not about a single loss. It is about endurance, adaptation, and the mission to ensure that Western Sahara does not become the next battlefield where instability spreads unchecked. Globe and Anchor James Austin

Mr. Mike We appreciate your application to the 3d MRB Realism Unit but, as our application message states, it is required to provide a realistic name, so we are unable to process your application at this time. Before we can process this application, it is also required to provide a valid ARMA 3 Player ID. To find out how, check this link. Please update your name with a valid, realistic name, according to our guidelines, if you wish to continue with the application process. Once you have found your player ID, please update your application with the proper PID, and post a reply in the topic in order to make the recruiters aware of the update. We will process this application as soon as possible. Respectfully submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Lowery, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation with the 160th SOAR. You will be attached to the Bataillion Commander LTC Brueske or a subordinate of his choosing and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for Flight School. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Warrant Officer Candidate. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Lowery, Before we can process this application, it is required to provide a valid Steam Profile Link. This can be found at the top of your steam program by clicking on (your steam username), going down to profile then copy and paste the URL located under the tabs (Store, Library, Community, (your steam name here)). It is also required to provide a valid ARMA 3 Player ID. To find out how, check this link. Once you have found your player ID and Steam Profile Link, please update your application with both, and post a reply in the topic in order to make the recruiters aware of the update. We will process this application as soon as possible. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Danger We appreciate your application to the 3d MRB Realism Unit but, as our application message states, it is required to provide a realistic name, so we are unable to process your application at this time. Please update your name with a valid, realistic name according to our guidelines, if you wish to continue with the application process. Respectfully submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Miller, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation with the 160th SOAR. You will be attached to the Bataillion Commander LTC Brueske or a subordinate of his choosing and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for Flight School. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Warrant Officer Candidate. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Bob We appreciate your application to the 3d MRB Realism Unit but, as our application message states, it is required to provide a realistic name, so we are unable to process your application at this time. Please update your name with a valid, realistic name according to our guidelines, if you wish to continue with the application process. Respectfully submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Cinch, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation for the team you wish to join. You will be attached to the headquarters element and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If the Team HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Private. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Wolf, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation for the team you wish to join. You will be attached to the headquarters element and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If the Team HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Private. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

Mr. Palmer, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation for the team you wish to join. You will be attached to the headquarters element and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If the Team HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Private. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

U.S. Tactical Evidence Report SULTANS WRATH MSOT 8313 01-25 — Recovered Insurgent Materiel Classification: FOR OPERATIONAL USE ONLY Date: 27th June, 2025 Unit: 3d MRB, S-2 Intelligence, EOD/Forensic Team Location: AO SULTANS WRATH 01-15, MSOT 8313. Items Secured: MANPADS: 2x Igla-series type tubes (operational condition unknown; warhead absent from one tube). Mortars: 3x tube assemblies (60 mm class) with 7 associated mortar rounds (varied condition). Preliminary Forensic Notes: External markings and manufacturing traits on several components are consistent with older Algerian inventory / eastern-bloc production. Serial number recovery ongoing; several surfaces are degraded by wear and tear/heat. Provenance Assessment: At present, no definitive chain-of-custody or transfer lineage can be demonstrated. Viable hypotheses include: Longstanding caches or theft from regional depots (historical losses). Illicit market transfers via smuggling networks. Battlefield capture/recirculation. External supply—cannot be confirmed without serial trace and forensic match. Recommended Follow-On Tasks: Priority forensic trace: serial recovery, metallurgy, and explosive signature analysis. SIGINT tasking: retrospective pull for traffic indicative of weapons handoffs along known smuggling routes (Tindouf corridor, border crossings). CI/HUMINT: vet detainee claims against recovered item details; task host-nation CI to review recent inventory losses. Operational: locate and capture further caches to increase data points for further analysis and confirmation of equipment provenance, increase surveillance on known or suspected smuggling routes.

YOUSSEF AHMED BENKHALED Classification: TOP SECRET – Field Use Only PERSONAL INFORMATION Name: Youssef Ahmed Benkhaled Alias: Youssef Date of Birth: 14 March 1980 Place of Birth: Tamanrasset, Algeria Nationality: Algerian Current Affiliation: Sahrawi Resistance / Polisario Front Current Role: Field Commander, Western Sahara Operations PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION Height: 1.78 m Weight: 75 kg Hair: Black Eyes: Brown Distinguishing Marks: Scar on left forearm, tribal tattoo on right shoulder FAMILY TIES & PERSONAL MOTIVATION Father: Algerian Army officer, retired; provided early military exposure. Mother: Sahrawi; passed away in 2020. Impact: Death of his mother marked a turning point, intensifying his commitment to Sahrawi self-determination. Siblings: One younger brother, remains in Algeria; occasional liaison contact. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD 1999–2003 2nd Commando Regiment, Tamanrasset: Airborne infantry, desert operations 2003–2007 1st Special Forces Regiment, Boghar: Recon, counter-insurgency, advanced commando training 2006 IMET, USA: Counterterrorism & convoy security; Fort Bragg & Fort Benning. Training records verified by U.S. DoD. Curriculum included convoy drills, small-unit tactics, and counter-IED operations. 2007–2010 Algerian Army Liaison, Algiers: International training coordination 2008 -2010 TSCTP: Regional counterterrorism, cross-border interdiction; verified by US D.o.D. 2010–Present Sahrawi Resistance / Polisario Front: Field commander; ambushes, sabotage, convoy interdiction TRAINING & QUALIFICATIONS ESTS, Biskra (2000–2002): Airborne & commando operations EFCIP, Boghar (2002–2003): Advanced commando & sabotage IMET, USA (2006–2007, CONFIRMED): Counterterrorism & convoy security; U.S. DoD verified TSCTP (2008, CONFIRMED): Regional counterterrorism coordination IDEOLOGICAL PROFILE Deeply committed to Sahrawi self-determination, shifted decisively in 2020 after mother’s death Views U.S. support to Morocco as complicit in occupation Motivates forces using both tactical proficiency and political narrative COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NOTES High threat: combines professional training, confirmed U.S. tactical exposure, and operational leadership Probable link to Laayoune leak compromising Moroccan convoy movements Network spans refugee camps and border regions PRIORITY ACTIONS Track and neutralize Youssef to disrupt operational cohesion HUMINT collection in Sahrawi camps for corroboration CI sweep of Moroccan channels for potential insider leaks RISK ASSESSMENT Operational Security: OPFOR exhibits high situational awareness and ideological motivation Counterintelligence Exposure: confirmed IMET/TSCTP participation represents a doctrinal vulnerability; U.S. convoy and counter-IED training exploited against Moroccan/U.S. interests Psychological Influence: detainees and sympathizers frame U.S. as morally compromised, potentially boosting recruitment and morale

HUMINT LEAD PACKET — SULTANS WRATH (Derived from D-01 / D-02) Classification: SECRET – Operational Use Only Date: June 26, 2025 Prepared by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence HET / Intel Cell 1) Executive Summary Two detainees provided partial, evasive testimony. Key HUMINT leads: (1) an operational commander known as “Youssef,” (2) a probable insider leak in Laayoune, (3) foreign-sourced explosives (Russian/Cyrillic packaging), and (4) persistent rumors that Youssef once trained with U.S. forces during an exchange/liaison program while serving in the Algerian army. This last point, while unverified, could explain his familiarity with U.S. convoy doctrine and counter-ambush drills. 2) Source Reliability & Assessment D-01 (25–30, low-level fighter): Low reliability; evasive, confrontational, ideological focus. Provided general admissions (wall charges, ambush structure) but no specifics. D-02 (35–40, senior fighter/driver): Medium reliability; combative but more informative. Confirmed “Youssef” as commander, referenced foreign-sourced explosives, alluded to IMET/TSCTP training. Both detainees corroborate: Ambush executed with professional-level discipline. Familiarity with U.S. convoy tactics. Ideological framing of U.S. as enabling Moroccan suppression of Sahrawi people. 3) Key HUMINT Leads “Youssef” — Ambush Commander Nom de guerre; reportedly ex-Algerian army officer. Detainees allege exposure to U.S.-funded training programs (possibly IMET, TSCTP). Tactical impact: likely source of OPFOR knowledge of herringbone dispersal and convoy SOP exploitation. Priority: High — identification, service history, training records verification. Insider leak — Laayoune Both detainees claim Moroccan officials compromised convoy route. Priority: High — CI investigation to identify personnel with access to ministerial movement data. Explosives & logistics Wall charges of probable foreign origin (Russian/Cyrillic markings). Priority: Medium — forensic analysis, trace supply networks. Ideological motivation & propaganda Detainees frame U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression. Use of interrogations to reinforce narrative of righteous struggle. Priority: Medium — assess messaging impact on local recruitment or morale. OPFOR tactics & discipline Execution of L-shaped ambush, coordinated flanking, timed withdrawal demonstrates high-level tactical proficiency. Priority: Medium — assess training source, replication risk, countermeasures. 4) Corroboration & Collection Requirements CI / HUMINT: Confirm “Youssef” identity and IMET/TSCTP training participation. Investigate Laayoune administrative leak — transport/protocol offices. Interview refugee camp sources for confirmation of leadership identity and prior Algerian service. Forensics / Technical Exploitation: Examine wall charges and blast residue for origin and supply-chain links. SIGINT / IMINT: Review communications around Smara ambush. Monitor suspected staging areas, safehouses, and vehicle movements. Open-source / Liaison: Check IMET / TSCTP training rosters (2000–2015) for Algerian officers matching “Youssef.” Leverage partner intelligence for corroboration without tipping detainee-derived leads. 5) Analyst Comment The detainees’ combative and ideological framing indicates OPFOR confidence and attempts to psychologically challenge U.S. moral authority. The rumor of U.S. training (IMET/TSCTP) is consistent with historical programs and could explain the precision exploitation of U.S. convoy SOPs. Insider leaks from Laayoune remain a probable operational vulnerability. OPFOR demonstrates professional-level small-unit tactics, suggesting foreign or institutional training exposure. Counterintelligence priority: Confirm “Youssef” identity and training background; neutralize leadership node to disrupt operational cohesion. 6) Immediate Recommendations Re-interrogate D-02 to focus specifically on: IMET/TSCTP training timeline and Youssef’s role in Algerian military. Names, locations, or facilitators of Laayoune leaks. Forensic / SIGINT coordination: Trace explosives, validate supply lines, monitor communications. CI Measures: Audit Moroccan channels for potential insider leaks; implement protective protocols for convoy planning. Source Development: Expand HUMINT coverage in refugee camps and local populations to corroborate leadership structure and past foreign exposure. 7) Risk Assessment Operational Security: OPFOR has high situational awareness and is ideologically motivated; detainee compartmentalization likely protects leadership. Counterintelligence Exposure: IMET/TSCTP alumni could represent doctrinal vulnerability if confirmed. Psychological Influence: Detainees actively seek to frame U.S. involvement as morally compromised, potentially affecting local perception and recruitment.

INTERROGATION TRANSCRIPT — DETAINEES CAPTURED BY MSOT 8311 SULTANS WRATH 01-25 Classification: SECRET – HUMINT / Operational Use Only Date: 24–25 June 2025 Location: COP Atlas, Western Sahara AO Conducted by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence, HUMINT Collection Team Session 1: Detainee D-01 Profile: Male, approx. 25–30, Polisario fighter. Disposition: Aggressive, confrontational. Q: Who commanded the ambush? A: “Command? You think we need your ranks, your shiny uniforms and papers? We fight because we must. Every man in that desert knows his duty. One day our people will be free, inshallah.” Q: Who is "Youssef"? (NOTE: Suspected nom de guerre of OPFOR Commander - collected through SIGINT during Sultans Wrath 01-25) A: [leans forward] “Youssef fights for our people, not for a king who sells the land to foreigners. He fought before, he fights with his people now. That is all you need to know.” Q: Three US diplomats are dead. How did your people know the convoy’s route? A: “The minister travels with your diplomats, thinking the desert belongs to Rabat and Washington. Everyone knows your patterns. The sand speaks, and so do greedy traitors in Morocco’s offices. They would sell their mother for the right price.” Q: Your people executed a textbook L-shape ambush. Where did that training come from? A: [smirks] “From watching you. From your manuals, your arrogance. You taught Algeria, and now your lessons come back at you. You gave us the tools, and we sharpened them.” Q: Did Youssef train with U.S. forces? A: “Maybe he trained in Algeria, maybe in your own bases. Does it sting to know your own programs make us stronger?” — End Session. D-01 repeatedly frames U.S. as an occupier’s enabler, defiant and ideological. Provided no direct admissions, but confirmed awareness of U.S.-Algerian training links. Session 2: Detainee D-02 Profile: Male, approx. 35–40, senior Polisario fighter. Disposition: Cold, combative but more measured. Q: Who led your ambush? A: “I will only answer if you promise to not hand me over to the Morrocans. They do not treat their prisoners well. My brother has been missing for 15 years." Q: We can't promise you that. The more you cooperate the better your chances are at remaining in US custody. A: “Truthfulness leads to righteousness, and righteousness leads to Paradise.” [Note: later identified as a muslim proverb] "Call him Youssef. I suspect you already know the name. He is Sahrawi in heart, Algerian in past. He has seen your soldiers up close — maybe even wore your patch for a time. Does that frighten you?” Q: Was he part of Algerian army training with the U.S.? A: “Your country trained many in Algiers. You sent officers, you taught convoy drills, counter-terror. You thought they would fight your wars. Instead they fight ours. You cannot undo that.” Q: How was the convoy compromised? A: “Do you think Morocco keeps secrets? Their officials sell them for money, for favors. Your people trust a rotten house, then wonder why the roof falls.” Q: Where are your explosives coming from? A: “From friends who still believe we are more than shadows. The crates had cyrillc writing, but the fire is Sahrawi. You cannot stop it.” Q: What is your objective with these attacks? A: [raises voice] “Our objective? Freedom! The same word your country claims to live by. But you arm the king and call us terrorists. We are the Sahrawi people, and until the last camp in Tindouf is empty, until the wall falls, we will fight — with your tactics if we must, against your allies if we must.” — End Session. D-02 provided sharper ideological justification, acknowledged possible IMET/TSCTP exposure indirectly, and deliberately positioned U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression. HUMINT Exploitation Notes Both detainees leveraged interrogation to push a political narrative and not a religious one, positioning U.S. as an enabler of Moroccan oppression. Deep seated religious beliefs remain however a factor. References to IMET and TSCTP were made indirectly, framed as proof that U.S. training seeded their tactical proficiency. Youssef possibly identified as ex-Algerian army with foreign training exposure; detainees deliberately taunted U.S. interrogators with this fact. High ideological motivation: detainees more concerned with message projection than self-preservation.

Mr. Webber, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation with the 160th SOAR. You will be attached to the Bataillion Commander LTC Brueske or a subordinate of his choosing and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for Flight School. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Warrant Officer Candidate. Respectfully Submitted, SSgt Waller S-1 Personnel Detachment

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR): Smara Ambush Classification: SECRET – Operational Use Only Date/Time of Incident: June 22nd, 2025 / 21:00 local time Location: Highway south of Smara, Western Sahara Unit Involved: Moroccan Interior Ministry Convoy w/ U.S. State Dept. presence including protective detail Composition of Convoy 2x Off-road vehicles (lead) 2x Armored SUVs (carrying Minister + U.S. personnel) Enemy Forces Assessed Polisario Front combat element 2x Elements (~8–10 fighters) 4x Technicals (DSchK HMGs) Timeline of Events 21:00 – Moroccan Interior Ministry convoy departs Smara with U.S. State Dept. personnel embedded. 21:40 – Convoy encounters deliberate road obstruction (abandoned vehicle/debris), halting lead elements. 21:41 – Convoy executes herringbone dispersal maneuver in accordance with SOP. OPFOR initiates ambush, exploiting predictable formation. 21:41–21:42 – Ambush triggered: Linear element delivers suppressive fire from covered positions to the front of the convoy. Enfilade element fires from newly created breach points — enemy employed wall charges to open fields of fire and establish the perpendicular leg of the L-shape. 21:44 – Moroccan security detail attempts suppression; lead and trail vehicles effectively pinned. 21:46–21:49 – Four technicals maneuver to flank possible escape routes; controlled, disciplined fire indicates rehearsed battle drill. 21:50 – OPFOR begins coordinated withdrawal under covering fire. Technicals exfiltrate south. 22:11 – Moroccan QRF arrives. Ambush site cleared, but enemy already disengaged. Enemy Tactics The ambush was executed in a textbook L-shape, with direct fire from a linear element along the route and enfilading fire from a perpendicular support-by-fire position. Enemy demonstrated knowledge of U.S. convoy drills, exploiting predictable herringbone reactions by concentrating fires on dispersal points. Effective use of terrain for concealment and kill zones indicates advanced small-unit training and deliberate reconnaissance. Assessment of Security Compromise The convoy route and timing appear to have been compromised in advance. Indicators suggest a security leak within Moroccan channels. Enemy positioning and timing were too precise to have been coincidental; route intelligence was likely passed with actionable detail. Operational Analysis The ambush represents a significant escalation in OPFOR capability. The proficiency in both planning and execution suggests a commander with advanced training, possibly foreign-advised. The OPFOR commander’s understanding of U.S. convoy tactics raises the likelihood of exposure to U.S. doctrine — through captured manuals, observation, or external military instruction. Recommendations Immediate priority: Identification of the OPFOR commander responsible. His capture or kill is assessed as critical to degrading enemy operational cohesion. Counterintelligence measures: Conduct a full investigation into Moroccan administrative and military channels for leaks. Convoy protocol adjustment: Reduce predictability of movements; introduce deception measures and varied route planning. U.S. advisory role: Enhanced training for Moroccan escorts in counter-ambush drills beyond standard herringbone, incorporating irregular and adaptive responses. Conclusion: This was not a random attack but a deliberate, well-planned ambush, executed with precision. The enemy demonstrated tactical proficiency on par with professional armed forces, pointing to both advanced intelligence gathering and advanced training within the Polisario command structure. Neutralizing the responsible commander is essential to restoring operational security and deterring further high-profile attacks.