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Age: 31 First Name: Josh Last Name: O'Brien Discord Username: jayobee24 Steam Profile Link: https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198073263286/ ArmA III Player ID: 76561198073263286 Desired Duty Assignment: 0372 Critical Skills Operator How Long have you been playing ArmA III: 1,573.3 hours *dab* Are you currently a member of an ArmA III gaming clan or unit?: Nope Do you own or, during the next time they are on sale, will you own the Arma 3 Apex and Contact DLCs? (Requirement) Yep Availability (Sunday/Saturday/Both): Sunday How did you find out about our unit? Former memberrrr If you were recruited by one of our members, who was it? 1st Lt Derr Why do you want to join the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion? Dropping bodies with the homies Do you understand the definition of realism gaming according to the 3d MRB and willing to abide by this game style? Yup Do you understand this unit is EST(GMT -5) time zoned based. Operations take place on Saturday at 1800 EST and Sunday at 2000 EST. Yezzir

WARNING ORDER MSOT 8311 Legion SITUATION: After deploying to advise and support Moroccan forces as they push South against the Polisario Front, US and allied forces have encountered a more determined and increasingly better-equipped opponent. Several ambushes have hurt the lead Moroccan elements and allied forces are now consolidating their positions before restarting their advance. They have requested our support in clearing operations. ENEMY: The main OPFOR in this AO are Polisario Front forces. This insurgent group has made extensive use of hit-and-run tactics, as well as ditching equipment and attempting to blend in with the civilian populace. Force size, equipment, and exact tactics are unknown at this time. FRIENDLY: 16th Mechanized Brigade, Royal Moroccan Army Royal Moroccan Air Force MISSION: MSOT 8311 will conduct a raid against a suspected weapons smuggler at OBJ DONKEY Be ready for possible further tasking 160th SOAR will Support MSOT 8311 Be ready for possible further tasking COMMANDERS INTENT: Eliminate a potential source of weapons for the PF and gain intelligence on the OPFOR equipment situation RECONNAISSANCE: The accuracy of enemy positions along the front lines is based on possibly outdated intel given the fluid situation, and it should not be heavily relied upon. 8311 AO OBJ DONKEY WEATHER: Clear 02JUL25 IU 20:00 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT N/A SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS N/A Code Words SHATTER: Sending station is combat ineffective. HAVOC: Comms compromised, scramble comms. END WARNING ORDER

WARNING ORDER MSOT 8312 VIKING SITUATION: The Moroccan Army has faced stiff resistance in their recent offensive against the Polisario Front. Moroccan high command is unwilling to bring overwhelming firepower to bear against an AO that still contains many non-combatants and has requested US support on the ground. A Co 3d MRB will conduct a series of raids against known insurgent strongholds IOT further ours and the Royal Moroccan army's understanding of the opposition in this AO ENEMY: The main OPFOR in this AO are Polisario Front forces. This insurgent group has made extensive use of hit-and-run tactics, as well as ditching equipment and attempting to blend in with the civilian populace. Force size, equipment, and exact tactics are unknown at this time. FRIENDLY: 16th Mechanized Brigade of the Royal Moroccan Army ODA 0111, A Co. 1st Btn. 10th SFG 160th SOAR MISSION: OBJ HAM SANDWICH has been identified as an insurgent hideout. Long abandoned, the 3 compounds have seen a renewed surge in activity with the start of the Moroccan offensive. OBJ HAM SANDWICH is believed to be an overnight safehouse for insurgents and weapons trafficking. Taking this OBJ may net significant intel in how the Polisario front operates. MSOT 8312 will Conduct a raid on OBJ HAM SANDWICH 160th SOAR will Coordinate air support with MSOT 8312 COMMANDERS INTENT: Seize OBJ HAM SANDWICH Detain any personel Conduct SSE in order to enhance the Task Forces understanding of Polisario Front assets in the region Hold OBJ HAM SANDWICH until relieved at approx. 21:40 Local time. RECONNAISSANCE: OBJ HAM SANDWICH, drone images, 2 hours old WEATHER: Clear Sky 21:00 Local Time. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT N/A SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS N/A Code Words SHATTER: Sending station is combat ineffective. HAVOC: Comms compromised, scramble comms. END WARNING ORDER

HUMINT LEAD PACKET — SULTANS WRATH (Derived from D-01 / D-02) Classification: SECRET – Operational Use Only Date: June 26, 2025 Prepared by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence HET / Intel Cell 1) Executive Summary Two detainees provided partial, evasive testimony. Key HUMINT leads: (1) an operational commander known as “Youssef,” (2) a probable insider leak in Laayoune, (3) foreign-sourced explosives (Russian/Cyrillic packaging), and (4) persistent rumors that Youssef once trained with U.S. forces during an exchange/liaison program while serving in the Algerian army. This last point, while unverified, could explain his familiarity with U.S. convoy doctrine and counter-ambush drills. 2) Source Reliability & Assessment D-01 (25–30, low-level fighter): Low reliability; evasive, confrontational, ideological focus. Provided general admissions (wall charges, ambush structure) but no specifics. D-02 (35–40, senior fighter/driver): Medium reliability; combative but more informative. Confirmed “Youssef” as commander, referenced foreign-sourced explosives, alluded to IMET/TSCTP training. Both detainees corroborate: Ambush executed with professional-level discipline. Familiarity with U.S. convoy tactics. Ideological framing of U.S. as enabling Moroccan suppression of Sahrawi people. 3) Key HUMINT Leads “Youssef” — Ambush Commander Nom de guerre; reportedly ex-Algerian army officer. Detainees allege exposure to U.S.-funded training programs (possibly IMET, TSCTP). Tactical impact: likely source of OPFOR knowledge of herringbone dispersal and convoy SOP exploitation. Priority: High — identification, service history, training records verification. Insider leak — Laayoune Both detainees claim Moroccan officials compromised convoy route. Priority: High — CI investigation to identify personnel with access to ministerial movement data. Explosives & logistics Wall charges of probable foreign origin (Russian/Cyrillic markings). Priority: Medium — forensic analysis, trace supply networks. Ideological motivation & propaganda Detainees frame U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression. Use of interrogations to reinforce narrative of righteous struggle. Priority: Medium — assess messaging impact on local recruitment or morale. OPFOR tactics & discipline Execution of L-shaped ambush, coordinated flanking, timed withdrawal demonstrates high-level tactical proficiency. Priority: Medium — assess training source, replication risk, countermeasures. 4) Corroboration & Collection Requirements CI / HUMINT: Confirm “Youssef” identity and IMET/TSCTP training participation. Investigate Laayoune administrative leak — transport/protocol offices. Interview refugee camp sources for confirmation of leadership identity and prior Algerian service. Forensics / Technical Exploitation: Examine wall charges and blast residue for origin and supply-chain links. SIGINT / IMINT: Review communications around Smara ambush. Monitor suspected staging areas, safehouses, and vehicle movements. Open-source / Liaison: Check IMET / TSCTP training rosters (2000–2015) for Algerian officers matching “Youssef.” Leverage partner intelligence for corroboration without tipping detainee-derived leads. 5) Analyst Comment The detainees’ combative and ideological framing indicates OPFOR confidence and attempts to psychologically challenge U.S. moral authority. The rumor of U.S. training (IMET/TSCTP) is consistent with historical programs and could explain the precision exploitation of U.S. convoy SOPs. Insider leaks from Laayoune remain a probable operational vulnerability. OPFOR demonstrates professional-level small-unit tactics, suggesting foreign or institutional training exposure. Counterintelligence priority: Confirm “Youssef” identity and training background; neutralize leadership node to disrupt operational cohesion. 6) Immediate Recommendations Re-interrogate D-02 to focus specifically on: IMET/TSCTP training timeline and Youssef’s role in Algerian military. Names, locations, or facilitators of Laayoune leaks. Forensic / SIGINT coordination: Trace explosives, validate supply lines, monitor communications. CI Measures: Audit Moroccan channels for potential insider leaks; implement protective protocols for convoy planning. Source Development: Expand HUMINT coverage in refugee camps and local populations to corroborate leadership structure and past foreign exposure. 7) Risk Assessment Operational Security: OPFOR has high situational awareness and is ideologically motivated; detainee compartmentalization likely protects leadership. Counterintelligence Exposure: IMET/TSCTP alumni could represent doctrinal vulnerability if confirmed. Psychological Influence: Detainees actively seek to frame U.S. involvement as morally compromised, potentially affecting local perception and recruitment.

INTERROGATION TRANSCRIPT — DETAINEES CAPTURED BY MSOT 8311 SULTANS WRATH 01-25 Classification: SECRET – HUMINT / Operational Use Only Date: 24–25 June 2025 Location: COP Atlas, Western Sahara AO Conducted by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence, HUMINT Collection Team Session 1: Detainee D-01 Profile: Male, approx. 25–30, Polisario fighter. Disposition: Aggressive, confrontational. Q: Who commanded the ambush? A: “Command? You think we need your ranks, your shiny uniforms and papers? We fight because we must. Every man in that desert knows his duty. One day our people will be free, inshallah.” Q: Who is "Youssef"? (NOTE: Suspected nom de guerre of OPFOR Commander - collected through SIGINT during Sultans Wrath 01-25) A: [leans forward] “Youssef fights for our people, not for a king who sells the land to foreigners. He fought before, he fights with his people now. That is all you need to know.” Q: Three US diplomats are dead. How did your people know the convoy’s route? A: “The minister travels with your diplomats, thinking the desert belongs to Rabat and Washington. Everyone knows your patterns. The sand speaks, and so do greedy traitors in Morocco’s offices. They would sell their mother for the right price.” Q: Your people executed a textbook L-shape ambush. Where did that training come from? A: [smirks] “From watching you. From your manuals, your arrogance. You taught Algeria, and now your lessons come back at you. You gave us the tools, and we sharpened them.” Q: Did Youssef train with U.S. forces? A: “Maybe he trained in Algeria, maybe in your own bases. Does it sting to know your own programs make us stronger?” — End Session. D-01 repeatedly frames U.S. as an occupier’s enabler, defiant and ideological. Provided no direct admissions, but confirmed awareness of U.S.-Algerian training links. Session 2: Detainee D-02 Profile: Male, approx. 35–40, senior Polisario fighter. Disposition: Cold, combative but more measured. Q: Who led your ambush? A: “I will only answer if you promise to not hand me over to the Morrocans. They do not treat their prisoners well. My brother has been missing for 15 years." Q: We can't promise you that. The more you cooperate the better your chances are at remaining in US custody. A: “Truthfulness leads to righteousness, and righteousness leads to Paradise.” [Note: later identified as a muslim proverb] "Call him Youssef. I suspect you already know the name. He is Sahrawi in heart, Algerian in past. He has seen your soldiers up close — maybe even wore your patch for a time. Does that frighten you?” Q: Was he part of Algerian army training with the U.S.? A: “Your country trained many in Algiers. You sent officers, you taught convoy drills, counter-terror. You thought they would fight your wars. Instead they fight ours. You cannot undo that.” Q: How was the convoy compromised? A: “Do you think Morocco keeps secrets? Their officials sell them for money, for favors. Your people trust a rotten house, then wonder why the roof falls.” Q: Where are your explosives coming from? A: “From friends who still believe we are more than shadows. The crates had cyrillc writing, but the fire is Sahrawi. You cannot stop it.” Q: What is your objective with these attacks? A: [raises voice] “Our objective? Freedom! The same word your country claims to live by. But you arm the king and call us terrorists. We are the Sahrawi people, and until the last camp in Tindouf is empty, until the wall falls, we will fight — with your tactics if we must, against your allies if we must.” — End Session. D-02 provided sharper ideological justification, acknowledged possible IMET/TSCTP exposure indirectly, and deliberately positioned U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression. HUMINT Exploitation Notes Both detainees leveraged interrogation to push a political narrative and not a religious one, positioning U.S. as an enabler of Moroccan oppression. Deep seated religious beliefs remain however a factor. References to IMET and TSCTP were made indirectly, framed as proof that U.S. training seeded their tactical proficiency. Youssef possibly identified as ex-Algerian army with foreign training exposure; detainees deliberately taunted U.S. interrogators with this fact. High ideological motivation: detainees more concerned with message projection than self-preservation.