Leaderboard

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR): Smara Ambush Classification: SECRET – Operational Use Only Date/Time of Incident: June 22nd, 2025 / 21:00 local time Location: Highway south of Smara, Western Sahara Unit Involved: Moroccan Interior Ministry Convoy w/ U.S. State Dept. presence including protective detail Composition of Convoy 2x Off-road vehicles (lead) 2x Armored SUVs (carrying Minister + U.S. personnel) Enemy Forces Assessed Polisario Front combat element 2x Elements (~8–10 fighters) 4x Technicals (DSchK HMGs) Timeline of Events 21:00 – Moroccan Interior Ministry convoy departs Smara with U.S. State Dept. personnel embedded. 21:40 – Convoy encounters deliberate road obstruction (abandoned vehicle/debris), halting lead elements. 21:41 – Convoy executes herringbone dispersal maneuver in accordance with SOP. OPFOR initiates ambush, exploiting predictable formation. 21:41–21:42 – Ambush triggered: Linear element delivers suppressive fire from covered positions to the front of the convoy. Enfilade element fires from newly created breach points — enemy employed wall charges to open fields of fire and establish the perpendicular leg of the L-shape. 21:44 – Moroccan security detail attempts suppression; lead and trail vehicles effectively pinned. 21:46–21:49 – Four technicals maneuver to flank possible escape routes; controlled, disciplined fire indicates rehearsed battle drill. 21:50 – OPFOR begins coordinated withdrawal under covering fire. Technicals exfiltrate south. 22:11 – Moroccan QRF arrives. Ambush site cleared, but enemy already disengaged. Enemy Tactics The ambush was executed in a textbook L-shape, with direct fire from a linear element along the route and enfilading fire from a perpendicular support-by-fire position. Enemy demonstrated knowledge of U.S. convoy drills, exploiting predictable herringbone reactions by concentrating fires on dispersal points. Effective use of terrain for concealment and kill zones indicates advanced small-unit training and deliberate reconnaissance. Assessment of Security Compromise The convoy route and timing appear to have been compromised in advance. Indicators suggest a security leak within Moroccan channels. Enemy positioning and timing were too precise to have been coincidental; route intelligence was likely passed with actionable detail. Operational Analysis The ambush represents a significant escalation in OPFOR capability. The proficiency in both planning and execution suggests a commander with advanced training, possibly foreign-advised. The OPFOR commander’s understanding of U.S. convoy tactics raises the likelihood of exposure to U.S. doctrine — through captured manuals, observation, or external military instruction. Recommendations Immediate priority: Identification of the OPFOR commander responsible. His capture or kill is assessed as critical to degrading enemy operational cohesion. Counterintelligence measures: Conduct a full investigation into Moroccan administrative and military channels for leaks. Convoy protocol adjustment: Reduce predictability of movements; introduce deception measures and varied route planning. U.S. advisory role: Enhanced training for Moroccan escorts in counter-ambush drills beyond standard herringbone, incorporating irregular and adaptive responses. Conclusion: This was not a random attack but a deliberate, well-planned ambush, executed with precision. The enemy demonstrated tactical proficiency on par with professional armed forces, pointing to both advanced intelligence gathering and advanced training within the Polisario command structure. Neutralizing the responsible commander is essential to restoring operational security and deterring further high-profile attacks.

//SECRET//JSOC//USASOC//MARSOC From: [email protected] <Thomas Godfrey> To: [email protected] <Sean Morrison> [email protected] <Nathan Brueske> Fwd: [email protected] <Jordan Hart> [email protected] <Matthew Boyle> [email protected] <Micheal Hawkins> Subject: NOTICE OF IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT All Commands and Attachments are hereby notified that A-Co (Rein)—3d MRB, 1st BN (Rein)—160th SOAR are to prepare for immediate deployment to the Western Sahara in support of USAFRICOM. All commands are to ensure OPSEC through rank and file. All assets and personnel will report to Charleston AFB within 24 hours for initial deployment by the 437th Special Operations Squadron to Agadir Air Force Base in Morocco. 1st BN—160th SOAR will be responsible for deploying the joint force from Agadir AFB to COP Atlas in central Western Sahara within 12 hours after initial touchdown. Today three state department officials were ambushed and killed by members of the armed separatist group "The Polisario Front" while traveling with the Moroccan Minister of the Interior south of Samara (WS). In response, Washington has requested increased availability of SOF assets in the region. This joint force is being deployed to conduct COIN operations against The Polisario Front, prioritizing those specifically responsible for the ambush, and will be prepared to action on additional objectives needed by the Pentagon. Current operational intel is being forwarded to your respective S-2s for integration into your F3EAD Pipelines. Contact AFRICOM once established at COP Atlas for updated tasking. Good luck and Godspeed gentlemen. Signed, General Thomas A. Godfrey III Commanding United States Special Operations Command ATTACHMENTS westernsahara.jpg

HUMINT LEAD PACKET — SULTANS WRATH (Derived from D-01 / D-02) Classification: SECRET – Operational Use Only Date: June 26, 2025 Prepared by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence HET / Intel Cell 1) Executive Summary Two detainees provided partial, evasive testimony. Key HUMINT leads: (1) an operational commander known as “Youssef,” (2) a probable insider leak in Laayoune, (3) foreign-sourced explosives (Russian/Cyrillic packaging), and (4) persistent rumors that Youssef once trained with U.S. forces during an exchange/liaison program while serving in the Algerian army. This last point, while unverified, could explain his familiarity with U.S. convoy doctrine and counter-ambush drills. 2) Source Reliability & Assessment D-01 (25–30, low-level fighter): Low reliability; evasive, confrontational, ideological focus. Provided general admissions (wall charges, ambush structure) but no specifics. D-02 (35–40, senior fighter/driver): Medium reliability; combative but more informative. Confirmed “Youssef” as commander, referenced foreign-sourced explosives, alluded to IMET/TSCTP training. Both detainees corroborate: Ambush executed with professional-level discipline. Familiarity with U.S. convoy tactics. Ideological framing of U.S. as enabling Moroccan suppression of Sahrawi people. 3) Key HUMINT Leads “Youssef” — Ambush Commander Nom de guerre; reportedly ex-Algerian army officer. Detainees allege exposure to U.S.-funded training programs (possibly IMET, TSCTP). Tactical impact: likely source of OPFOR knowledge of herringbone dispersal and convoy SOP exploitation. Priority: High — identification, service history, training records verification. Insider leak — Laayoune Both detainees claim Moroccan officials compromised convoy route. Priority: High — CI investigation to identify personnel with access to ministerial movement data. Explosives & logistics Wall charges of probable foreign origin (Russian/Cyrillic markings). Priority: Medium — forensic analysis, trace supply networks. Ideological motivation & propaganda Detainees frame U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression. Use of interrogations to reinforce narrative of righteous struggle. Priority: Medium — assess messaging impact on local recruitment or morale. OPFOR tactics & discipline Execution of L-shaped ambush, coordinated flanking, timed withdrawal demonstrates high-level tactical proficiency. Priority: Medium — assess training source, replication risk, countermeasures. 4) Corroboration & Collection Requirements CI / HUMINT: Confirm “Youssef” identity and IMET/TSCTP training participation. Investigate Laayoune administrative leak — transport/protocol offices. Interview refugee camp sources for confirmation of leadership identity and prior Algerian service. Forensics / Technical Exploitation: Examine wall charges and blast residue for origin and supply-chain links. SIGINT / IMINT: Review communications around Smara ambush. Monitor suspected staging areas, safehouses, and vehicle movements. Open-source / Liaison: Check IMET / TSCTP training rosters (2000–2015) for Algerian officers matching “Youssef.” Leverage partner intelligence for corroboration without tipping detainee-derived leads. 5) Analyst Comment The detainees’ combative and ideological framing indicates OPFOR confidence and attempts to psychologically challenge U.S. moral authority. The rumor of U.S. training (IMET/TSCTP) is consistent with historical programs and could explain the precision exploitation of U.S. convoy SOPs. Insider leaks from Laayoune remain a probable operational vulnerability. OPFOR demonstrates professional-level small-unit tactics, suggesting foreign or institutional training exposure. Counterintelligence priority: Confirm “Youssef” identity and training background; neutralize leadership node to disrupt operational cohesion. 6) Immediate Recommendations Re-interrogate D-02 to focus specifically on: IMET/TSCTP training timeline and Youssef’s role in Algerian military. Names, locations, or facilitators of Laayoune leaks. Forensic / SIGINT coordination: Trace explosives, validate supply lines, monitor communications. CI Measures: Audit Moroccan channels for potential insider leaks; implement protective protocols for convoy planning. Source Development: Expand HUMINT coverage in refugee camps and local populations to corroborate leadership structure and past foreign exposure. 7) Risk Assessment Operational Security: OPFOR has high situational awareness and is ideologically motivated; detainee compartmentalization likely protects leadership. Counterintelligence Exposure: IMET/TSCTP alumni could represent doctrinal vulnerability if confirmed. Psychological Influence: Detainees actively seek to frame U.S. involvement as morally compromised, potentially affecting local perception and recruitment.

INTERROGATION TRANSCRIPT — DETAINEES CAPTURED BY MSOT 8311 SULTANS WRATH 01-25 Classification: SECRET – HUMINT / Operational Use Only Date: 24–25 June 2025 Location: COP Atlas, Western Sahara AO Conducted by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence, HUMINT Collection Team Session 1: Detainee D-01 Profile: Male, approx. 25–30, Polisario fighter. Disposition: Aggressive, confrontational. Q: Who commanded the ambush? A: “Command? You think we need your ranks, your shiny uniforms and papers? We fight because we must. Every man in that desert knows his duty. One day our people will be free, inshallah.” Q: Who is "Youssef"? (NOTE: Suspected nom de guerre of OPFOR Commander - collected through SIGINT during Sultans Wrath 01-25) A: [leans forward] “Youssef fights for our people, not for a king who sells the land to foreigners. He fought before, he fights with his people now. That is all you need to know.” Q: Three US diplomats are dead. How did your people know the convoy’s route? A: “The minister travels with your diplomats, thinking the desert belongs to Rabat and Washington. Everyone knows your patterns. The sand speaks, and so do greedy traitors in Morocco’s offices. They would sell their mother for the right price.” Q: Your people executed a textbook L-shape ambush. Where did that training come from? A: [smirks] “From watching you. From your manuals, your arrogance. You taught Algeria, and now your lessons come back at you. You gave us the tools, and we sharpened them.” Q: Did Youssef train with U.S. forces? A: “Maybe he trained in Algeria, maybe in your own bases. Does it sting to know your own programs make us stronger?” — End Session. D-01 repeatedly frames U.S. as an occupier’s enabler, defiant and ideological. Provided no direct admissions, but confirmed awareness of U.S.-Algerian training links. Session 2: Detainee D-02 Profile: Male, approx. 35–40, senior Polisario fighter. Disposition: Cold, combative but more measured. Q: Who led your ambush? A: “I will only answer if you promise to not hand me over to the Morrocans. They do not treat their prisoners well. My brother has been missing for 15 years." Q: We can't promise you that. The more you cooperate the better your chances are at remaining in US custody. A: “Truthfulness leads to righteousness, and righteousness leads to Paradise.” [Note: later identified as a muslim proverb] "Call him Youssef. I suspect you already know the name. He is Sahrawi in heart, Algerian in past. He has seen your soldiers up close — maybe even wore your patch for a time. Does that frighten you?” Q: Was he part of Algerian army training with the U.S.? A: “Your country trained many in Algiers. You sent officers, you taught convoy drills, counter-terror. You thought they would fight your wars. Instead they fight ours. You cannot undo that.” Q: How was the convoy compromised? A: “Do you think Morocco keeps secrets? Their officials sell them for money, for favors. Your people trust a rotten house, then wonder why the roof falls.” Q: Where are your explosives coming from? A: “From friends who still believe we are more than shadows. The crates had cyrillc writing, but the fire is Sahrawi. You cannot stop it.” Q: What is your objective with these attacks? A: [raises voice] “Our objective? Freedom! The same word your country claims to live by. But you arm the king and call us terrorists. We are the Sahrawi people, and until the last camp in Tindouf is empty, until the wall falls, we will fight — with your tactics if we must, against your allies if we must.” — End Session. D-02 provided sharper ideological justification, acknowledged possible IMET/TSCTP exposure indirectly, and deliberately positioned U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression. HUMINT Exploitation Notes Both detainees leveraged interrogation to push a political narrative and not a religious one, positioning U.S. as an enabler of Moroccan oppression. Deep seated religious beliefs remain however a factor. References to IMET and TSCTP were made indirectly, framed as proof that U.S. training seeded their tactical proficiency. Youssef possibly identified as ex-Algerian army with foreign training exposure; detainees deliberately taunted U.S. interrogators with this fact. High ideological motivation: detainees more concerned with message projection than self-preservation.

Rabat, Algiers, Washington: The Dangerous Geometry of an Old War On a dusty highway south of Smara, what at first appeared to be another skirmish in a forgotten conflict may quickly escalate into a crisis with international ramifications. A convoy carrying Morocco’s Minister of the Interior was ambushed by armed separatists from the Polisario Front. The Minister survived with minor injuries. But among the dead were three American State Department officials traveling alongside him — an outcome that has turned a long-frozen dispute into an urgent matter of U.S. foreign policy. The site of the ambush on the Minister of the Interior. The Western Sahara has been at the center of Moroccan-Algerian rivalry for nearly half a century. After Spain’s withdrawal in 1975, Morocco annexed the territory, sparking a protracted guerrilla war with the Polisario Front, which had proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Algeria, emerging as a revolutionary republic and regional counterweight to Morocco’s monarchy, became the Polisario’s primary backer, offering arms, training, and sanctuary. Though the 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire halted open hostilities, the promise of a referendum on self-determination never materialized. The conflict settled into a “frozen” state, punctuated by sporadic clashes and diplomatic jousting. Rabat consolidated its control over most of the territory, building a vast sand berm fortified by mines and surveillance, while the Polisario maintained its base in Tindouf, Algeria. For decades, the United States kept a cautious distance, balancing support for Morocco’s monarchy with the principle of self-determination. That equilibrium broke after the recent attack, claiming the lives of three US dignitaries. That is when President Moore formally recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The move cements Morocco’s position but leaves Algeria and the Polisario more isolated than ever. Within hours of the ambush, Washington declared its “unwavering solidarity” with Rabat and signaled expanded cooperation on counterinsurgency. Joint intelligence-sharing, aerial surveillance, and even the deployment of U.S. military advisors are under discussion. This represents more than retaliation. Morocco has long presented itself to Washington as a linchpin in the struggle against jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel — a region where state authority crumbles under the advance of groups linked to al-Qaida, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State. By framing the Polisario’s actions as part of this broader instability, Rabat has successfully aligned its territorial ambitions with U.S. strategic concerns. Three US dignitaries were killed during the ambush. In Morocco, officials were quick to implicate Algeria. “This attack could not have been carried out without Algerian support,” declared a government spokesman, hinting at intelligence coordination behind the ambush. While direct evidence remains elusive, Washington’s conspicuous silence has been interpreted as tacit acceptance of Rabat’s narrative. For Algiers, the accusation is dangerous. Algeria remains Europe’s third-largest supplier of natural gas and has cultivated ties with Moscow, Beijing, and increasingly Ankara. Yet its rivalry with Morocco, sharpened by closed borders and military build-up on both sides, remains central to its foreign policy. Open confrontation, however, risks entangling Algeria in a conflict it may not wish to escalate — particularly given its fragile domestic politics and economic dependence on energy exports. For Morocco’s monarchy, the ambush offers a grim but potent political dividend. It reinforces nationalist calls for a “final settlement” of the Western Sahara issue, while international sympathy strengthens Rabat’s claim that the Polisario are no longer freedom fighters but terrorists destabilizing the Maghreb. Yet the implications extend beyond Moroccan domestic politics. A deeper U.S. footprint in North Africa risks transforming a regional rivalry into a broader geopolitical contest. Russia, already Algeria’s arms supplier, may seize the opportunity to tighten its influence. The European Union, dependent on Algerian gas but also invested in stability along the Mediterranean as part of it's immigration policies, faces renewed pressure to balance between two adversaries. A checkpoint allegedly manned by Polisario Front separatists. Amid this diplomatic maneuvering, the Sahrawi people themselves remain trapped in limbo. Tens of thousands still live in refugee camps around Tindouf, their lives suspended between exile and unfulfilled promises of self-determination. For them, the ambush may be seen as an act of resistance, a desperate attempt to reinsert their cause into a world that has largely relegated it to the margins. Yet as the violence escalates, their political agency risks being subsumed by great power rivalry. The ambush near Smara was not only a violent strike against a ministerial convoy. It was a moment that redefined alliances and hardened fault lines in the Maghreb. By drawing Washington directly into the conflict, it has transformed a decades-long stalemate into a potential flashpoint of international confrontation. A sahrawi refugee camp run by IDAP Whether this alignment brings stability through Moroccan strength or deepens instability by provoking Algerian retaliation remains uncertain. What is clear is that the Western Sahara — long treated as a forgotten corner of postcolonial politics — may become a stage where local grievances and global rivalries collide. Editorial: Toward a New Proxy War? The ambush in Western Sahara that killed three American officials and nearly claimed the life of Morocco’s Minister of the Interior is more than an escalation of a long-frozen conflict. It is a warning: the Maghreb risks becoming the next proxy battlefield of global politics. The outlines of this new confrontation are already visible. Washington, having recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, now doubles down with promises of counterinsurgency support. Rabat, emboldened, portrays separatists not as a political movement but as “terrorists” threatening regional stability. Algiers, meanwhile, entrenched in its historic support for the Polisario Front, leans ever more heavily on Moscow and Beijing for diplomatic and military backing. What is at stake is not simply the future of the Sahrawi people — exiled in camps, divided by a fortified berm, and abandoned by the promises of international law. It is the transformation of their struggle into a pawn on the chessboard of global rivalry. Just as Afghanistan once stood at the intersection of Cold War strategies, Western Sahara now risks being cast in the role of proxy battlefield, where local grievances serve as the fuel for distant ambitions. Europe, caught between dependence on Algerian gas and security cooperation with Morocco, will be forced into contradictions it cannot easily reconcile. The Sahel, already destabilized by armed groups, may see its crises compounded by this new polarization. And the Sahrawi, who once hoped for self-determination under the auspices of the United Nations, are now consigned to invisibility, their future traded between power blocs. The United States may believe it is securing stability by binding itself to Rabat. Algeria may believe it is defending a principle by sustaining the Polisario. Both are mistaken. What they risk creating is yet another arena where the grievances of a marginalized people are subsumed into a geopolitical contest whose costs will be borne not in Washington or Algiers, but in the refugee camps of Tindouf and the contested streets of Laayoune. If the international community allows Western Sahara to become the next proxy war, it will not only betray the Sahrawi people — it will add yet another chapter to the long history of conflicts where global powers fight by proxy, and local populations pay the price. Revue Diplomatique Rachid Benyamina – North Africa and Sahel specialist