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Age: 31 First Name: Josh Last Name: O'Brien Discord Username: jayobee24 Steam Profile Link: https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198073263286/ ArmA III Player ID: 76561198073263286 Desired Duty Assignment: 0372 Critical Skills Operator How Long have you been playing ArmA III: 1,573.3 hours *dab* Are you currently a member of an ArmA III gaming clan or unit?: Nope Do you own or, during the next time they are on sale, will you own the Arma 3 Apex and Contact DLCs? (Requirement) Yep Availability (Sunday/Saturday/Both): Sunday How did you find out about our unit? Former memberrrr If you were recruited by one of our members, who was it? 1st Lt Derr Why do you want to join the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion? Dropping bodies with the homies Do you understand the definition of realism gaming according to the 3d MRB and willing to abide by this game style? Yup Do you understand this unit is EST(GMT -5) time zoned based. Operations take place on Saturday at 1800 EST and Sunday at 2000 EST. Yezzir

BREAKING: SECRET US SPECIAL FORCES OPERATION IN GUINEA EXPOSED — GLOBALISTS PANIC AS AMERICAN PATRIOTS STOP MASS SLAUGHTER! THEY LIED TO YOU AGAIN! For THREE WEEKS the corporate media has been running cover for what insiders are now calling the “Guinea Collapse Event” — a total implosion of the Guinean state triggered by CIA-backed coup factions, foreign mercenary networks, and transnational NGOs tied directly to the Brussels-Langley banking cartel. You think I’m joking? WHY are military satellites being repositioned over West Africa? WHY did encrypted traffic between NATO command nodes spike 800% overnight? WHY are unmarked cargo aircraft landing in neighboring countries with transponders disabled? Because this isn’t “civil unrest,” folks. THIS IS A LIVE EXPERIMENT! Sources embedded inside intelligence contracting groups tell us the situation on the ground has devolved into full ethnic extermination campaigns carried out by heavily armed militia factions using imported weapons that somehow magically crossed six borders without a single UN inspection team noticing. OH WOW! WHAT A COINCIDENCE! And now the same people who told you “nothing is happening” are suddenly evacuating diplomats under cover of darkness while special operations teams conduct unauthorized extraction missions deep inside contested territory. BUT HERE’S THE REAL STORY THEY DON’T WANT YOU TO HEAR! American operators reportedly discovered entire foreign civilian communities as well as foreign aid workers trapped behind militia checkpoints while these international aid organizations refused to intervene because acknowledging the massacres would “destabilize regional messaging frameworks.” THAT’S A REAL TERM THEY USE. “MESSAGING FRAMEWORKS.” Human beings are being butchered while bureaucrats in air-conditioned compounds argue over public relations optics and diversity briefing documents. Meanwhile, global media outlets are under direct pressure to suppress reports of targeted killings because it would “complicate the geopolitical narrative.” In other words: the truth is bad for business. And who’s funding this chaos? Follow the money. Mineral conglomerates. Private military contractors. Cryptocurrency laundering pipelines. Defense lobbyists. The same supranational think tanks that engineered disasters across Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and South America for thirty straight years. THEY CREATE THE CRISIS! THEN THEY SELL THE SOLUTION! But something went wrong in Guinea. According to leaked chatter from intelligence circles, US special forces on the ground began disobeying containment directives after witnessing atrocities firsthand. Instead of merely extracting embassy personnel, operators allegedly started moving civilians through covert evacuation corridors against direct recommendations from international “observers.” Translation? Patriots inside the machine saw the horror and decided they weren’t going to sit there while innocents got fed into the grinder for another globalist regime-change operation. They are putting an end to the white Genocide in Guinea. And when they come back they'll put an end to the white genocide happening in our country for they now have seen the truth! But for now the Deep State is furious. WHY do you think the media suddenly stopped talking about Guinea entirely? WHY are social media posts disappearing? WHY are independent journalists getting shadowbanned the moment they mention militia atrocities? Because the narrative collapsed. The elites wanted another controlled destabilization event they could exploit for resources, surveillance expansion, and regional dependency. Instead, the situation spun out of control and exposed the entire rotten system. This is what the New World Order looks like in practice: manufactured collapse, resource extraction, mass displacement, and information warfare designed to make you doubt your own eyes. Today it’s Guinea. Tomorrow it’ll be somewhere else. And while the technocrats lecture you about democracy and humanitarian values, black-budget aircraft are flying through African night skies carrying people out of kill zones the media pretends don’t exist. WAKE UP SHEEPLE! The battle is no longer left versus right. It’s humanity versus the machine. And the machine is getting desperate. Jones Alex, Databattles - because there is a battle for your mind!

Age: 27 First Name: Per Last Name: Van Dyke Discord Username: sulu244 Steam Profile Link: https://steamcommunity.com/id/sulu244/ ArmA III Player ID: 76561198049411918 Desired Duty Assignment: 0372 Marine Raider How Long have you been playing ArmA III: 2300+ hours Are you currently a member of an ArmA III gaming clan or unit?: No Do you own or, during the next time they are on sale, will you own the Arma 3 Apex and Contact DLCs?: Yes Availability (Sunday/Saturday/Both): Both How did you find out about our unit? Retired Member If you were recruited by one of our members, who was it? N/A Why do you want to join the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion? The green goblin mask in the corner is calling me. (Hi Boyle) Do you understand the definition of realism gaming according to the 3d MRB and willing to abide by this game style? Yes Do you understand this unit is EST(GMT -5) time zoned based. Operations take place on Saturday at 1800 EST and Sunday at 2000 EST. Yes

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR): Smara Ambush Classification: SECRET – Operational Use Only Date/Time of Incident: June 22nd, 2025 / 21:00 local time Location: Highway south of Smara, Western Sahara Unit Involved: Moroccan Interior Ministry Convoy w/ U.S. State Dept. presence including protective detail Composition of Convoy 2x Off-road vehicles (lead) 2x Armored SUVs (carrying Minister + U.S. personnel) Enemy Forces Assessed Polisario Front combat element 2x Elements (~8–10 fighters) 4x Technicals (DSchK HMGs) Timeline of Events 21:00 – Moroccan Interior Ministry convoy departs Smara with U.S. State Dept. personnel embedded. 21:40 – Convoy encounters deliberate road obstruction (abandoned vehicle/debris), halting lead elements. 21:41 – Convoy executes herringbone dispersal maneuver in accordance with SOP. OPFOR initiates ambush, exploiting predictable formation. 21:41–21:42 – Ambush triggered: Linear element delivers suppressive fire from covered positions to the front of the convoy. Enfilade element fires from newly created breach points — enemy employed wall charges to open fields of fire and establish the perpendicular leg of the L-shape. 21:44 – Moroccan security detail attempts suppression; lead and trail vehicles effectively pinned. 21:46–21:49 – Four technicals maneuver to flank possible escape routes; controlled, disciplined fire indicates rehearsed battle drill. 21:50 – OPFOR begins coordinated withdrawal under covering fire. Technicals exfiltrate south. 22:11 – Moroccan QRF arrives. Ambush site cleared, but enemy already disengaged. Enemy Tactics The ambush was executed in a textbook L-shape, with direct fire from a linear element along the route and enfilading fire from a perpendicular support-by-fire position. Enemy demonstrated knowledge of U.S. convoy drills, exploiting predictable herringbone reactions by concentrating fires on dispersal points. Effective use of terrain for concealment and kill zones indicates advanced small-unit training and deliberate reconnaissance. Assessment of Security Compromise The convoy route and timing appear to have been compromised in advance. Indicators suggest a security leak within Moroccan channels. Enemy positioning and timing were too precise to have been coincidental; route intelligence was likely passed with actionable detail. Operational Analysis The ambush represents a significant escalation in OPFOR capability. The proficiency in both planning and execution suggests a commander with advanced training, possibly foreign-advised. The OPFOR commander’s understanding of U.S. convoy tactics raises the likelihood of exposure to U.S. doctrine — through captured manuals, observation, or external military instruction. Recommendations Immediate priority: Identification of the OPFOR commander responsible. His capture or kill is assessed as critical to degrading enemy operational cohesion. Counterintelligence measures: Conduct a full investigation into Moroccan administrative and military channels for leaks. Convoy protocol adjustment: Reduce predictability of movements; introduce deception measures and varied route planning. U.S. advisory role: Enhanced training for Moroccan escorts in counter-ambush drills beyond standard herringbone, incorporating irregular and adaptive responses. Conclusion: This was not a random attack but a deliberate, well-planned ambush, executed with precision. The enemy demonstrated tactical proficiency on par with professional armed forces, pointing to both advanced intelligence gathering and advanced training within the Polisario command structure. Neutralizing the responsible commander is essential to restoring operational security and deterring further high-profile attacks.

FIELD ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM Guinea Internal Conflict Escalation Restricted Distribution / Immediate Release to 3d MRB S-2 Intelligence FROM: Mr. Black TO: West Africa Desk DATE: 09OCT25 SUBJECT: Escalating Ethnic Killings Conducted by Pro-Government Militias in Central Guinea Recent intelligence gathering from central Guinea indicates a rapid escalation in organized ethnic violence targeting Fulani civilian populations in areas under partial control or influence of pro-government militia formations aligned with the ruling GGNS military junta. Multiple independent local sources, humanitarian contacts, and intercepted communications suggest militia units associated with the Guinean Movement for the Preservation of National Dignity (GMPND) have conducted coordinated clearing operations in villages surrounding the prefecture of Al Quisa and surrounding prefectures. The operations appear designed not merely to suppress insurgent activity, but to collectively punish communities suspected of sympathizing with Fulani armed resistance groups. Civilian Killings Witness testimony collected over the last 48 hours describes: House-to-house searches targeting Fulani families Forced disappearances of adult males Execution-style killings near temporary militia checkpoints Destruction of livestock reserves and grain storage Systematic burning of abandoned villages Several survivors reported militia fighters accusing civilians of “harboring traitors” and “protecting enemies of Guinea.” The majority of reporting attributes operational leadership in the region to militia commander Hassan-Brahim Zambo, a former local security organizer who has emerged as one of the most influential pro-junta militia leaders outside the capital. Zambo reportedly commands several hundred irregular fighters operating alongside sympathetic local security personnel. Witnesses consistently describe his forces as highly mobile, lightly motorized, and operating with apparent confidence that they will not face intervention from state authorities. Mass Grave Allegations Three separate local contacts reported the discovery or construction of suspected mass burial sites near abandoned settlements north of Al Quisa. One site was corrobated by preleminary on the ground intelligence gathering by CIA field operatives and 3d MRB personnel. Satellite review remains inconclusive due to terrain and vegetation cover, but imagery analysts identified multiple areas of disturbed earth consistent with hurried excavation activity near militia-controlled road corridors for the other sites. One source described civilians being forced at gunpoint to dig trenches before being transported away in yellow trucks. The final disposition of those detainees remains unknown. Exact casualty figures cannot currently be verified. However, humanitarian estimates suggest the number of civilians killed in recent anti-Fulani operations may already be in the high hundreds. The violence is expected to rise and the casualty numbers will increase accordingly without intervention. Information Environment State-aligned broadcasters and pro-junta political figures continue amplifying rhetoric linking Fulani communities broadly to “terrorism,” “treason,” and alleged responsibility for the death of President Sekouba Soumah. A fulani helicopter mechanic has been publicly executed for treason in the death of the president. There is no intelligence corroborating these claims. This messaging appears to be contributing directly to militia mobilization and retaliatory violence. The distinction between armed insurgents and civilians is increasingly absent from public security discourse. Several regional observers warn the conflict is beginning to exhibit characteristics associated with early-stage mass atrocity environments: Ethnic scapegoating Militia decentralization Dehumanizing propaganda Population displacement Informal detention networks Collective punishment operations Assessment Current trends suggest the junta may be either unwilling or unable to restrain aligned militia actors operating in rural areas. The emergence of Hassan-Brahim Zambo as a prominent field commander is particularly concerning due to: His growing regional influence Apparent operational autonomy Use of ethnically targeted rhetoric Expanding recruitment networks among nationalist youth groups Absent meaningful external pressure or internal fragmentation within the junta, further escalation against Fulani civilian populations is likely. The situation is increasingly moving beyond counterinsurgency dynamics toward organized communal violence. Outlook If current militia operations continue unchecked, Guinea risks entering a self-sustaining cycle of ethnic reprisals and mass displacement. The greatest immediate danger is that localized killings evolve into normalized regional cleansing campaigns carried out under the justification of restoring national security. At present, fear — rather than formal state authority — is becoming the primary governing force across large sections of the interior.

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE LA SÉCURITÉ EXTÉRIEURE CLASSIFICATION: TRÈS SECRET EYES ONLY — PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE / NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS / CEMA (Chef d'État-Major des Armées) FROM: Directeur Général de la Sécurité Extérieure TO: Président de la République SUBJECT: Guinean Transitional Council Allegations and Regional Operational Assessment DATE: October 9th, 2025 Mr. President, Following the public accusations issued by the Guinean Transitional Military Council, I can formally confirm that the allegations directed toward the French Republic, the DGSE, and associated humanitarian organizations are false and unsupported by any operational record available to this Directorate. France is not conducting offensive intelligence, destabilization, or paramilitary operations within Guinea. No French personnel have participated in hostile actions against Guinean military forces, and no authorized operation exists aimed at undermining the current transitional government through covert action or armed intervention. The accusations concerning IDAP are likewise without factual basis. Current reporting indicates the organization has operated primarily in a humanitarian and logistical support role within affected civilian sectors. We have identified no evidence that IDAP facilities knowingly supported espionage operations or armed militant activity under French direction. Our assessment remains that the Guinean leadership is intentionally weaponizing anti-French sentiment to consolidate domestic authority amid worsening internal instability, insurgent violence, and international isolation. The invocation of “colonial restoration” narratives appears specifically designed to mobilize nationalist sentiment while legitimizing emergency security measures and the detention of foreign personnel. The junta’s decision to classify all IDAP personnel and affiliated aid workers as potential spies significantly increases the likelihood of arbitrary detention operations and forced confessions intended for state media exploitation. That said, several operational details surrounding the checkpoint engagement warrant close scrutiny. The two deceased foreign nationals described by Guinean authorities do not correspond to any known DGSE personnel, assets, or partner operatives currently assigned to the region. All French intelligence personnel operating within West Africa remain fully accounted for. Furthermore, military descriptions of the individuals involved — including advanced encrypted communications equipment, tactical mobility, weapons handling standards, and extraction-oriented logistical preparation — are inconsistent with current French clandestine operating doctrine in the region. Signals intercepts collected during the forty-eight hours preceding the incident identified communications patterns in southern Guinea bearing stronger resemblance to American special mission support architectures than to any known French intelligence framework presently active in West Africa. Additional indicators include irregular aerial traffic activity across neighboring states, increased offshore military posture in the Gulf of Guinea, and unusual compartmentalized communications routing associated with Western security elements operating outside established NATO coordination mechanisms. While no definitive conclusion can yet be established, available intelligence suggests the possibility that unilateral American contingency operations may have been underway independently and without prior consultation with French regional partners. The Guinean government’s immediate exploitation of the incident appears intended to remove foreign observers from contested areas before broader domestic security operations commence. The military seizure of aid compounds and communications infrastructure will likely reduce independent visibility into civilian casualty events and counterinsurgency actions over the coming weeks. Recommendations follow: Publicly reject all Guinean accusations in unequivocal diplomatic terms. Avoid direct public speculation regarding possible American involvement while pursuing urgent clarification through liaison channels. Coordinate with European and ECOWAS partners regarding the unlawful detention risk facing humanitarian personnel. Accelerate contingency evacuation planning for French nationals remaining inside Guinea. Increase intelligence surveillance coverage over Gulf of Guinea air corridors and adjacent regional logistics routes. Prepare for expanded information operations portraying France as the architect of regional destabilization and neo-colonial interference. At present, our assessment is that the Transitional Military Council is operating from a position of escalating paranoia compounded by fragmented battlefield awareness and mounting international isolation. Additional expulsions, detentions, and anti-Western propaganda operations remain highly probable in the immediate term. Respectfully, Admiral Laurent Delorme Directeur Général Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE TRANSITIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND SOVEREIGN INTEGRITY The Transitional Military Council announces that Guinean security forces operating near Jableh have eliminated two armed foreign operatives linked to an illegal French intelligence network operating inside the Republic of Guinea. The individuals ignored repeated orders to surrender and opened hostilities while attempting to cross into a restricted military security corridor. Both were neutralized by Guinean forces. Weapons, encrypted communications equipment, forged identification papers, and intelligence materials recovered at the scene confirm direct foreign involvement in ongoing destabilization efforts against the Guinean state. Preliminary investigations conducted by military intelligence indicate that the so-called International Development Assistance Program (IDAP) has been operating as a covert French proxy organization under the false cover of humanitarian work. Evidence suggests IDAP personnel have coordinated with French intelligence officers to gather military intelligence, transport illegal communications equipment, conceal armed actors inside aid compounds, and support efforts to undermine Guinea’s lawful transitional government. The Transitional Military Council further believes these operations are part of a broader French campaign to restore foreign political influence and re-establish colonial domination over Guinea through espionage, economic sabotage, disinformation, and armed subversion. Over the last twenty-four hours, multiple Guinean servicemen have been killed in attacks conducted near IDAP-controlled facilities and foreign aid encampments. Military investigators are examining direct connections between these attacks and French-backed operatives currently active inside the country. Accordingly, the following emergency security measures are now in effect nationwide: The French Ambassador is declared persona non grata and must leave Guinea within 24 hours. All French diplomatic, intelligence, and military personnel are ordered to depart Guinean territory immediately. All IDAP operations within Guinea are suspended indefinitely. Any individual employed by, cooperating with, or providing support to IDAP will be detained pending counterintelligence investigation. IDAP compounds, vehicles, warehouses, and communications infrastructure are now under military control. Foreign NGOs operating inside Guinea will undergo immediate security review and inspection. Expanded counterintelligence and border security operations are now authorized nationwide under emergency wartime authority. The Transitional Military Council warns all foreign governments against interference in Guinea’s internal affairs. Any nation found supporting armed groups, espionage networks, or attempts to destabilize the republic will face decisive retaliation. Guinea will never again submit to foreign occupation, foreign manipulation, or colonial control disguised as humanitarian assistance. The people of Guinea are urged to remain vigilant against foreign agents, collaborators, and disinformation campaigns designed to weaken national unity and sovereignty. Suspicious activity should be reported immediately to the nearest military authority. Issued on behalf of the Transitional Military Council General Sékouba Camara Conakry, Republic of Guinea

From: [email protected] To: [email protected] CC: EVP Africa Operations, General Counsel INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL Understood. To answer your first question directly: I believe the probability of significant instability is now materially higher than at any point in the last decade. The concern is less about a coordinated insurgency and more about state fragmentation. The Guinean government still controls the cities, but outside the urban corridors authority is becoming increasingly negotiated between local military officers, ethnic networks, and informal armed groups. Once that process accelerates, incidents that would normally remain isolated can spread extremely quickly. The mining sector is especially exposed because: We are geographically fixed We rely on vulnerable transit infrastructure We employ large numbers of foreign nationals We are associated — fairly or unfairly — with state elites and foreign influence Regarding deterrence: I am not proposing a paramilitary occupation of our sites. The recommendation would be a low-visibility but highly capable contractor presence consisting primarily of former military personnel providing: Hardened perimeter security Discreet overwatch teams Route reconnaissance Emergency extraction capability Executive protection for senior staff movement The point is not to fight militias. The point is to convince militias that attacking us would be costly, complicated, and unlikely to succeed. Right now, we are visibly vulnerable. That perception matters. I’ll have the full assessment package prepared before EOD. Philippe Kind regards Philippe de Hautcloq Global Risk Assessment Director D +41 41 709 20 20 E-mail: [email protected] Glencore AG - Energizing today, Advancing tomorrow Baarermatstrasse 3 6340 Baar Switzerland ------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: [email protected] To: [email protected] CC: EVP Africa Operations, General Counsel INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL Hi Philippe Understood. I want hard clarity on two issues before we move further: Are we talking about a genuine threat to operational continuity, or are we overreacting to regional instability that may remain politically contained? What does “visible deterrence” actually look like in practice? The last thing this company needs is photographs circulating online of foreign contractors in armored vehicles outside one of our facilities while opposition politicians accuse us of building a private army. I appreciate the security rationale, but the reputational and legal exposure here could become significant very quickly. Please prepare: A formal threat projection covering the next 90 days Cost estimates Candidate firms Political risk analysis if deployment becomes public Assessment of whether host government approval would be required or merely “encouraged” Also include evacuation timelines for expatriate personnel under worst-case conditions. Let’s review tomorrow morning. Gary Kind regards Gary Nagel Chief Executive Officer D +41 41 709 20 10 E-mail: [email protected] Glencore AG - Energizing today, Advancing tomorrow Baarermatstrasse 3 6340 Baar Switzerland ---- From: [email protected] To: [email protected] CC: EVP Africa Operations, General Counsel INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL Hi Gary, Following this week’s field reporting from our regional security chiefs Nzérékoré and Kankan, I need to reiterate my growing concern regarding the trajectory of the security environment in Guinea. The situation remains officially “stable,” but our local contacts, subcontractors, and security personnel are all reporting a marked increase in ethnic hostility, checkpoint activity, and militia mobilization in the interior regions surrounding several of our logistical corridors. Of particular concern: Increased movement of armed community groups along secondary roads used by company convoys Anti-foreign rhetoric spreading through local radio and political youth networks Growing hostility toward mining operators perceived as aligned with the government Reports that local military units are increasingly unreliable outside major urban areas Escalating clashes between Fulani self-defense groups and pro-government militias in rural prefectures At present, our sites remain operational, but the current posture is insufficient if the situation deteriorates further. I strongly recommend we immediately expand our contracted security footprint in-country. Specifically, I propose engaging a reputable private military/security contractor capable of rapidly deploying: Static site security Convoy escort teams Aviation security detachments Intelligence and surveillance personnel Crisis response / extraction capabilities for expatriate staff To be clear, this would not be an offensive deployment. The objective is deterrence. Right now, local militias view corporate infrastructure and foreign personnel as soft targets. A visible, professional security presence would significantly reduce the likelihood of opportunistic attacks, kidnappings, sabotage, or labor unrest escalating into direct violence against company personnel. We are approaching the point where waiting for a triggering event may leave us reacting instead of shaping the environment. I recommend we discuss this urgently before the board call on Friday. Philippe Kind regards Philippe de Hautcloq Global Risk Assessment Director D +41 41 709 20 20 E-mail: [email protected] Glencore AG - Energizing today, Advancing tomorrow Baarermatstrasse 3 6340 Baar Switzerland

The Mahgreb Morass: A Border on the Brink Tensions across the Maghreb have sharpened following an incident that risks unravelling the region’s fragile balance. Earlier this week, United States special operations forces supporting Moroccan units in Western Sahara shot down an Algerian MiG-29 Fulcrum during an engagement with Polisario Front fighters. It is the most serious escalation since Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory earlier this year. Algeria has insisted the aircraft was on a routine training sortie and inadvertently crossed the border due to a navigational error. Rabat, by contrast, has condemned what it describes as a “flagrant violation” of Moroccan airspace and views the incident as further evidence of Algerian brinkmanship. Moroccan officials are reportedly observing a steady build-up of Algerian forces along the frontier with growing unease. Leaked picture of Morroccan investigators at the crash site. An older MIG-29 Fulcrum is valued at 5-10 million dollars depending on variant. For Washington, the downing of the MiG places its limited but sensitive deployment in an awkward position. What was intended as a counter-insurgency support mission has edged towards direct confrontation, blurring the line between tactical assistance and overt participation in a regional conflict. While American defence officials maintain that the engagement was purely defensive, the optics of a U.S. unit bringing down an Algerian aircraft could reverberate far beyond the Sahara. In Europe, the response has been cautious but telling. France — still diplomatically entwined with its former North African colonies and mindful of its own domestic constituencies — has revised its travel advisories, warning citizens against travel to both Morocco and Algeria. The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs cited “heightened regional tensions and unpredictable security conditions” as grounds for the update. The Western Sahara question, long relegated to the margins of post-colonial diplomacy, has returned as a flashpoint where old rivalries and new alliances intersect. The downing of a single aircraft has reminded all parties how swiftly the Maghreb’s latent hostilities can ignite — and how easily outside powers can find themselves drawn into the desert’s dangerous geometry.

WARNING ORDER MSOT 8311 Legion SITUATION: After deploying to advise and support Moroccan forces as they push South against the Polisario Front, US and allied forces have encountered a more determined and increasingly better-equipped opponent. Several ambushes have hurt the lead Moroccan elements and allied forces are now consolidating their positions before restarting their advance. They have requested our support in clearing operations. ENEMY: The main OPFOR in this AO are Polisario Front forces. This insurgent group has made extensive use of hit-and-run tactics, as well as ditching equipment and attempting to blend in with the civilian populace. Force size, equipment, and exact tactics are unknown at this time. FRIENDLY: 16th Mechanized Brigade, Royal Moroccan Army Royal Moroccan Air Force MISSION: MSOT 8311 will conduct a raid against a suspected weapons smuggler at OBJ DONKEY Be ready for possible further tasking 160th SOAR will Support MSOT 8311 Be ready for possible further tasking COMMANDERS INTENT: Eliminate a potential source of weapons for the PF and gain intelligence on the OPFOR equipment situation RECONNAISSANCE: The accuracy of enemy positions along the front lines is based on possibly outdated intel given the fluid situation, and it should not be heavily relied upon. 8311 AO OBJ DONKEY WEATHER: Clear 02JUL25 IU 20:00 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT N/A SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS N/A Code Words SHATTER: Sending station is combat ineffective. HAVOC: Comms compromised, scramble comms. END WARNING ORDER

//SECRET//JSOC//USASOC//MARSOC From: [email protected] <Thomas Godfrey> To: [email protected] <Sean Morrison> [email protected] <Nathan Brueske> Fwd: [email protected] <Jordan Hart> [email protected] <Matthew Boyle> [email protected] <Micheal Hawkins> Subject: NOTICE OF IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT All Commands and Attachments are hereby notified that A-Co (Rein)—3d MRB, 1st BN (Rein)—160th SOAR are to prepare for immediate deployment to the Western Sahara in support of USAFRICOM. All commands are to ensure OPSEC through rank and file. All assets and personnel will report to Charleston AFB within 24 hours for initial deployment by the 437th Special Operations Squadron to Agadir Air Force Base in Morocco. 1st BN—160th SOAR will be responsible for deploying the joint force from Agadir AFB to COP Atlas in central Western Sahara within 12 hours after initial touchdown. Today three state department officials were ambushed and killed by members of the armed separatist group "The Polisario Front" while traveling with the Moroccan Minister of the Interior south of Samara (WS). In response, Washington has requested increased availability of SOF assets in the region. This joint force is being deployed to conduct COIN operations against The Polisario Front, prioritizing those specifically responsible for the ambush, and will be prepared to action on additional objectives needed by the Pentagon. Current operational intel is being forwarded to your respective S-2s for integration into your F3EAD Pipelines. Contact AFRICOM once established at COP Atlas for updated tasking. Good luck and Godspeed gentlemen. Signed, General Thomas A. Godfrey III Commanding United States Special Operations Command ATTACHMENTS westernsahara.jpg

WARNING ORDER MSOT 8312 Viking SITUATION: MSOT 8312 has worked really hard lately. You deserve a beach episode. A day off has been permitted with moderate alcohol consumption courtesy of Manuel Diego Esperanza, owner of a local Tiki theme bar. LTC Brueske has volunteered to man the BBQ pit. ENEMY: Poor weather MPs FRIENDLY: Local Jetski rental place Manuel Diego Esperanza: Tiki bar owner MISSION: MSOT 8312 will Have a good time 160th SOAR will Provide BBQ support to MSOT 8312 COMMANDERS INTENT: Party! RECONNAISSANCE: WEATHER: Sunny 14NOV24 IU 17:00 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT Beachwear, Jetskis, rental cars SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Each element will designate a driver. Early load-in will be permitted around 19:20-19:30 EST ROE: Do not engage the tiki bar with excessive force. Code Words LAST CALL: Wrap up the night, time to go home. END WARNING ORDER

U.S. Military Supporting Venezuelan Rebels; Incident Highlights Challenges in New Phase of Democratization U.S. military forces are now operating in northern Venezuela in direct support of the Transitional Council’s rebel forces, following the death of Nicolás Maduro and the collapse of his loyalist government in much of the country. Marines and other U.S. personnel are working alongside rebel units to secure key infrastructure, stabilize contested regions, and prepare for humanitarian operations. The Pentagon confirmed the mission, stating, “U.S. forces are operating in support of efforts to restore democratic governance, uphold security, and protect civilians in coordination with Venezuela’s internationally recognized Transitional Council upon their request.” American personnel can be seen alongside rebel checkpoints and facilities, operating under U.S. flags. However, this new mission has not been without complications. During a routine security operation north of Chinu, a U.S. Marine vehicle reportedly opened fire on a civilian car after the driver failed to comply with checkpoint instructions. Though no injuries occurred, the vehicle was heavily damaged and the incident has sparked local frustration. The civilian involved, Luis Herrera, a 62-year-old delivery driver, spoke angrily to local media: “I did nothing wrong. I slowed down and then even stopped the car about 200 metres from their checkpoint. They didn’t say stop, they didn’t say go, and then suddenly they opened fire, when I tried to turn around, like I’m some kind of criminal. I ran for my life!” Herrera expressed outrage that no one from the U.S. forces had apologized directly, adding, “I worked ten years to buy that car. Now it’s scrap metal because some foreign soldier got nervous. Additionaly, it took me hours to find my way out of the jungle and I missed my granddaughter's wedding in Montelibano because of all this!” Mr. Herrera at the site of the alledged incident U.S. military officials declined to comment directly on the reported incident near Chinu, citing policies against discussing ongoing operations. A Pentagon spokesperson stated, “We do not comment on the specifics of operational movements or engagements in areas where U.S. forces may be present in support roles. However, we take any allegations of harm to civilians seriously and expect all personnel to uphold the highest standards of conduct and established Rules of Engagement.” Officials emphasized that any U.S. presence in the region is strictly focused on security cooperation and humanitarian preparation, not on direct engagement with Venezuelan civilians. Regarding compensation for the damaged vehicle, officials said such matters would be handled through appropriate local or transitional authorities, not through U.S. channels. Mr. Herrera with his damaged vehicle Editorial: Venezuela and the Perils of Another U.S. Intervention The recent news that U.S. military forces are operating openly in northern Venezuela in support of the Transitional Council should give everyone reason to pause. History has shown time and again that even well-intentioned interventions can spiral beyond their original objectives, leaving behind instability, resentment, and unintended consequences. The U.S. mission in Venezuela is framed as supporting democracy, protecting civilians, and helping stabilize a broken nation. These are admirable goals — but they sound strikingly familiar. From Vietnam and Iraq to Afghanistan, the pattern is clear: initial success breeds mission creep, which causes mistakes in turn causing friction with the local population. Eventually the backlash against foreign troops grows and they become seen not as liberators but occupiers. Already, the signs are there. The minor incident at a checkpoint — a Marine vehicle opening fire on a civilian’s car — has sparked anger and distrust among Venezuelans simply trying to survive. For Luis Herrera, the civilian whose livelihood was wrecked through no fault of his own, this is not a humanitarian mission. It’s an occupying force breaking things and walking away. Multiply that frustration by a thousand small mistakes, and goodwill evaporates fast. America’s military presence may help secure the Transitional Council’s fragile hold on power for now. But Washington must ask itself the harder question: how long will we stay, and at what cost? Stability cannot be imposed at gunpoint, and democracy rarely takes root under the shadow of foreign boots. If the U.S. is serious about helping Venezuela, it must ensure its presence does not sow the seeds of the next insurgency. The road to hell is paved with good intentions. Inés Suárez, On-Site Correspondent Del Mundo This article may also interest you: Two children killed by anti-personnel mines in the jungle near the town of Caucasia.

Age: 29 First Name: Matt Last Name: Costa Discord Username: Costa Steam Profile Link:http://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198017417292 ArmA III Player ID: 76561198017417292 Desired Duty Assignment: 0372 Marine Raider How Long have you been playing ArmA III: Since 2013 Are you currently a member of an ArmA III gaming clan or unit?: Nope Do you own or, during the next time they are on sale, will you own the Arma 3 Apex and Contact DLCs? (Requirement) (I own it) Availability (Sunday/Saturday/Both): Mostly Sundays How did you find out about our unit? Originally Hart´s channel If you were recruited by one of our members, who was it? I came back Why do you want to join the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion? Because it rocks Do you understand the definition of realism gaming according to the 3d MRB and willing to abide by this game style? Yes Do you understand this unit is EST(GMT -5) time zoned based. Operations take place on Saturday at 1800 EST and Sunday at 2000 EST. Yes

Guinea: President Soumah Dead - Military Seizes Power as Ethnic Violence Escalates Guinea’s government collapsed into chaos Tuesday following the sudden death of President Sekouba Soumah in a helicopter crash that has already triggered a military coup, widespread unrest, and growing fears the West African nation could slide toward ethnic civil conflict. Within hours of state media confirming Soumah’s death, armored vehicles and heavily armed soldiers appeared across the capital of Conakry. Key intersections, government ministries, telecommunications centers, and the national broadcaster were quickly occupied by military forces loyal to a newly declared ruling body calling itself the Guinean Government of National Salvation (GGNS). In a televised statement broadcast shortly after midnight local time, junta leader General Mamadou Kante announced the suspension of the constitution, dissolution of parliament, closure of national borders, and imposition of nationwide martial law. “The Republic has been betrayed from within,” Kante declared while flanked by armed officers. “The armed forces will restore order, unity, and national dignity.” The military government immediately blamed “Fulani extremist elements” for the president’s death, though no evidence has been publicly presented linking any organization or ethnic group to the helicopter crash. Violence Spreads Following Coup Across multiple regions of Guinea, reports are emerging of armed mobs, militia checkpoints, and targeted attacks against Fulani communities following the junta’s announcement. Witnesses in Kankan, Labé, and several smaller rural towns reported gunfire, looting, and violent clashes overnight between pro-government militias and armed Fulani groups. Entire neighborhoods in some mixed communities reportedly emptied within hours as civilians fled amid rumors of reprisals. Local sources describe scenes of panic on major roads leading out of interior towns, with thousands attempting to reach safer areas before additional checkpoints are established. Diplomatic officials and humanitarian organizations warn the situation is deteriorating rapidly. “The danger here is acceleration,” one Western security analyst currently monitoring the region told Grand Central Times. “Once a state begins framing an entire ethnic population as connected to terrorism or national betrayal, local violence can spread extremely fast — especially where armed militias already exist.” Crash Raises Questions The exact cause of Soumah’s helicopter crash remains unknown. According to preliminary government statements issued before the coup, the president had been traveling through underdeveloped eastern provinces as part of a regional infrastructure and security tour. Communication with the aircraft was lost and the wreckage was later located in remote terrain near the forest frontier. No survivors were found. Even before the military takeover, conspiracy theories surrounding the crash had already begun circulating widely online and through local radio broadcasts. Since seizing power, junta officials have repeatedly implied the crash was an assassination rather than an accident. Independent verification has not been possible. Western intelligence officials privately caution that the military may be using the uncertainty surrounding the president’s death to justify consolidating power and rallying nationalist support. President Soumah boarding the helicopter in question earlier this week. Guineas government has two one helicopter for high level officials to use. Military Moves Fast Analysts say the speed and coordination of the coup suggest at least elements of Guinea’s armed forces had prepared contingency plans well before Soumah’s death. Within hours of the crash announcement military units secured the presidential palace, telecommunications infrastructure was seized, airport access was restricted, senior civilian officials reportedly disappeared or were detained and curfews were imposed in major cities. The GGNS now appears to control most formal military assets in the country, including mechanized units, artillery forces, and air assets concentrated around Conakry and several regional centers. But beyond the urban centers, the situation is far less clear. Militias and Ethnic Polarization For years, Guinea’s worsening ethnic divisions had raised concerns among regional observers and foreign security analysts. The country’s political system had become increasingly polarized between Fulani political networks, Mandinka elites, and Susu power brokers tied to state institutions and sections of the military. In rural areas where state authority remained weak, communal defense groups gradually evolved into armed militias. Now, many of those militias appear to be mobilizing openly. The Guinean Movement for the Preservation of National Dignity (GMPND), a pro-government militia drawing support largely from Mandinka and Susu communities, has reportedly established checkpoints and patrols alongside sympathetic security forces in several regions. Opposing them is the National Movement for the Liberation of the Fulani People (NMLFP), an anti-government armed network claiming to defend Fulani civilians from persecution and retaliatory violence. Security experts fear the conflict may evolve less as a conventional military confrontation and more as decentralized ethnic violence spreading through villages and provincial towns. A fulani held checkpoint in the interior of Guinea, where government control is weak. Americans and Foreign Nationals at Risk The deteriorating security situation has raised urgent concerns for foreign nationals and international business operations throughout Guinea. The country remains one of the world’s most important exporters of bauxite, critical for global aluminum production, and hosts major Western, Chinese, and multinational mining investments. Several foreign corporations have reportedly begun emergency evacuation planning for expatriate workers and contractors. U.S. officials have not announced any military action, but sources familiar with contingency discussions say Washington is closely monitoring the safety of American citizens and diplomatic personnel in the region. The State Department is expected to update their travel advisory for Guinea soon. International Community Reacts Carefully Governments across Europe and North America have condemned the coup while calling for restraint and civilian protection. But behind closed doors, officials increasingly fear Guinea could become the latest example of how quickly fragile political systems can unravel after the sudden removal of a central authority figure. The memory of past ethnic mass-violence events across Africa continues to shape diplomatic thinking as reports of identity-based targeting multiply. Several regional governments have already begun discussing border security and potential refugee contingencies should the violence continue escalating. The Things To Come For now, Guinea remains in a state of profound uncertainty. The junta controls the capital and much of the formal military structure. But in large parts of the countryside, armed groups, frightened civilians, and local power brokers are increasingly shaping events faster than the central government can respond. The death of Sekouba Soumah did not create Guinea’s divisions. But it may have detonated them. As night falls across Conakry under military patrols and curfews, the greatest fear among diplomats and security officials is no longer simply political instability. It is that Guinea may be crossing the line between coup and catastrophe. Peter Rechets, Ground Correspondent Grand Central Times

Guinea: The Slow Fracturing of a Fragile State Beneath the Surface of Stability From the ministries of Conakry, Guinea still presents the appearance of continuity. The state functions, the ports remain open, ministers continue to speak the language of republican unity, and President Sekouba Soumah regularly assures foreign partners that the country is stable despite "localized disturbances" in the interior. Yet beyond the capital, another reality is taking shape. Across the forested southeast and the dry central highlands, the authority of the Guinean state has gradually thinned under the combined pressure of economic stagnation, corruption, rural neglect, and the politicization of ethnic identity. What appears externally as a manageable security situation increasingly resembles a slow-moving national fracture. In provincial towns, rumors circulate more quickly than official communiqués. Roadblocks appear overnight along secondary roads. Traders travel in convoys for protection. Young men gather around improvised checkpoints carrying hunting rifles and old Kalashnikovs inherited from earlier regional wars. Local administrators continue to fly the national flag above municipal offices, but many exercise only symbolic authority once night falls. The central government insists these tensions are temporary disturbances aggravated by criminality and smuggling networks. But within diplomatic and military circles, concern has grown that Guinea may be entering a dangerous pre-crisis phase in which ethnic polarization and state weakness begin reinforcing one another. Ethnicity and the Architecture of Power Guinea’s political system has long rested upon a fragile ethnic balancing act: The Fulani populations of central Guinea, historically influential in commerce and religious networks, have for decades accused successive governments of systematic political exclusion despite their demographic weight. Meanwhile, Mandinka elites tied to military and administrative structures remain influential in the east, while Susu political networks dominate significant portions of the coastal economy and state bureaucracy. Official discourse rarely acknowledges these divisions directly. Publicly, the government continues to promote a rhetoric of national cohesion inherited from the post-independence era. In practice, however, political loyalty, military appointments, public contracts, and regional development projects are increasingly interpreted through an ethnic lens. This perception has deepened over the past several years as economic conditions worsened. Outside the mining enclaves that generate Guinea’s immense mineral wealth, unemployment remains severe, infrastructure deteriorates rapidly beyond major urban centers, and access to public services is inconsistent. In many rural prefectures, the state exists primarily as a distant tax collector accompanied by poorly paid security forces. The resulting frustration has strengthened local identity networks at the expense of national institutions. Checkpoint manned by government forces in the capital as security measures have been ramping up the last couple days. The Militarization of Rural Society In large parts of the countryside, insecurity no longer derives solely from banditry. Communal self-defense groups — initially organized to protect villages, livestock corridors, and trade routes — have multiplied across several regions of the country. Though lightly armed, these organizations increasingly function as parallel security structures beyond meaningful state control. Some maintain informal relations with local military officers or provincial officials. Others operate independently but enjoy tacit political protection because they serve as useful instruments of territorial influence. Among Mandinka and Susu communities, pro-government groups frame themselves as defenders of national stability against what they describe as "separatist agitation" and "foreign-inspired destabilization." Within Fulani regions, local protection networks increasingly portray themselves as shields against state repression and ethnic intimidation. Each side describes its mobilization as defensive. Each interprets the mobilization of the other as preparation for aggression. The circulation of weapons throughout the region has accelerated this dynamic. Arms trafficked through neighboring conflict zones in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mali continue to move through Guinea’s porous borders. Old insurgent supply routes, dormant for years, are once again active. The Guinean state retains formal military superiority. Yet in many isolated districts, local officials privately acknowledge that security now depends less on national institutions than on negotiated coexistence between rival armed networks. Local port official being enticed to accelerate permits. A Government Increasingly Dependent on Force President Soumah’s administration has responded to rising unrest through a familiar combination of limited reform promises and expanding security measures. Military patrols have intensified in several interior regions. Opposition activists and community organizers accuse the government of arbitrary detentions and selective enforcement operations disproportionately targeting Fulani areas. State media, meanwhile, increasingly warns against "extremist elements" and "anti-national actors" allegedly seeking to destabilize the republic. The language remains deliberately ambiguous. But ambiguity itself has become politically useful. By blurring the distinction between armed militants, political opposition, and broader Fulani grievances, sections of the political establishment have gradually normalized a security narrative in which ethnic suspicion becomes intertwined with state preservation. At the same time, divisions are reportedly emerging within Guinea’s own military apparatus. Senior officers remain publicly loyal to the presidency, but younger commanders frustrated by corruption, poor logistics, and deteriorating field conditions increasingly question the government’s ability to maintain control if unrest spreads further. For now, these tensions remain contained within barracks conversations and intelligence reporting. Yet in many postcolonial states, the line separating military dissatisfaction from political intervention has historically proven thin. The Foreign Presence and the Return of Suspicion The deterioration of Guinea’s internal climate has also altered perceptions of foreign actors. Western mining firms, aid organizations, and diplomatic missions continue operating throughout the country, particularly in regions tied to bauxite and mineral extraction. But among segments of the population — especially younger urban activists — foreign involvement is increasingly viewed through the language of exploitation and covert influence. On local radio programs and social media networks, accusations circulate that foreign governments manipulate Guinea’s political system to secure access to strategic resources. Conspiracy narratives flourish most easily where state legitimacy has weakened. Several incidents involving harassment of foreign workers and aid personnel have already been reported in rural areas where armed groups exercise growing influence. Although these confrontations remain isolated, security analysts warn that in highly polarized environments, anti-foreign sentiment can spread rapidly once violence escalates. A convoy carrying bauxite and it's security awaiting permission to unload at the docks. A State Approaching the Threshold Guinea has not yet descended into open conflict. The institutions of the state continue to function. The military remains formally unified. Commercial activity persists in the capital. Most citizens continue their daily lives outside the rhythms of political crisis. Yet the country increasingly exhibits the warning signs common to states approaching systemic rupture: declining trust in institutions, growing reliance on communal armed structures, the politicization of ethnicity, and a governing elite that responds to fragmentation primarily through securitization. What makes such situations dangerous is not simply the existence of tension, but the unpredictability of the event that ultimately ignites it. For now, Guinea remains suspended between uneasy stability and the possibility of rapid collapse. But beneath the official language of order and national unity, the foundations of the state are beginning to shift. Revue Diplomatique Rachid Benyamina – North Africa and Sahel specialist

WARNING ORDER MSOT 8312 VIKING SITUATION: Moroccan forces have made good progress against Algerian forces in the Dariya region. The capture of OBJ TATOOINE and subsequent Moroccan breakthrough has unhinged the entire Algerian defensive posture in the AO. The Algerian 40th Division is in shambles but pockets of resistance remain and the Moroccan forces have paused in order to reorganize and bring up additional units. 3d MRB A Co. remains deployed at the tip of the Moroccan spear providing critical SOF capabilities. ENEMY: The main OPFOR in this AO remains the Algerian 40th Division. This division has been heavily atrited in the recent fighting and in reality amounts to nothing more than Brigade strength across the AO The 40th Division is also badly organized and appears to be suffering from significant communication problems. The 40th Division has been broken up into several smaller pockets of resistance. Garrison at OBJ ARGENT is expected below platoon strenght. Total strenght underground is unknown, proceed with caution. FRIENDLY: 16th Mechanized Brigade, Royal Moroccan Army (Reinforced) MISSION: Higher has identified and Algerian C&C complex on the Algerian-Morocco Border. Initial recon seems to indicate the presence of a underground facility. Multiple trucks and other military vehicles have been coming and going. The Above ground portion is being used as a FARP for Algerian rotary assets. SIGINT has determined that the facility commander, Colonel Yacine Belghoul (CODENAME: WATCHMAN), is present and coordinating Algerian reorganization efforts. Also present are a notable portion of the Polisario front leadership awaiting extraction to Algeria. The death or capture of these individuals is highly desireable. MSOT 8312 will conduct a raid on OBJ ARGENT IOT eliminate the FARP and capture or destroy and rotary assets. Moroccan forces will arrive to secure the above ground portion as soon as they can get organized. 160th SOAR will support MSOT 8312 and 16th Mech as availability permits. COMMANDERS INTENT: Seize and/or destroy Algerian C&C facilities at OBJ ARGENT. (PRIMARY) Kill or Capture Colonel Yacine Belghoul CODENAME: WATCHMAN (SECONDARY) Kill or Captrue Polisario leaders. (TERTIARY) RECONNAISSANCE: WEATHER: Clear 02AUG25 IU 04:00 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT GMV and MATVs available at base. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Forward staging of GMVs and/or MATV at Moroccan positions is possible no closer than 6 km from OBJ ARGENT Code Words SHATTER: Sending station is combat ineffective. HAVOC: Comms compromised, scramble comms. END WARNO

Age:23 First Name:Wade Last Name:Fox Discord Username:Cortex_Apex#2849 Steam Profile Link: https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198212611848/ ArmA III Player ID: Cortex_Apex Desired Duty Assignment:Pilot How Long have you been playing ArmA III:well ive been playing since 2015 and i have 3,925.8 hrs on arma 3 Are you currently a member of an ArmA III gaming clan or unit?:no Do you own or, during the next time they are on sale, will you own the Arma 3 Apex and Contact DLCs? (Requirement) (answer here)i have some DLC but not all of them Availability (Sunday/Saturday/Both):both but it depends on work How did you find out about our unit? (answer here) friend If you were recruited by one of our members, who was it? (answer here)Leo and that guy coop Why do you want to join the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion? (answer here)looking for a unit that i can enjoy and have fun in Do you understand the definition of realism gaming according to the 3d MRB and willing to abide by this game style? (answer here) yes i understand the definition Do you understand this unit is EST(GMT -5) time zoned based. Operations take place on Saturday at 1800 EST and Sunday at 2000 EST. (answer here)yes i understand and i dont mind

Mr Mitchell, Application accepted. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation with the 160th SOAR. You will be attached to aviation headquarters and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If Aviation HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Warrant Officer Candidate. Respectfully Submitted, HM1 (FMF) Roe S-1 Chief

Age: 17 First Name:Tony Last Name:Arch Discord Username:Night231 Steam Profile Link:https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198932636165/ ArmA III Player ID 76561198932636165 Desired Duty Assignment: Critical Skills Operator. How Long have you been playing ArmA III: For a little while, about 105 ish hours on the game. Are you currently a member of an ArmA III gaming clan or unit?: No. Do you own or, during the next time they are on sale, will you own the Arma 3 Apex and Contact DLCs? (Requirement) Yes. Availability (Sunday/Saturday/Both): Both How did you find out about our unit? Dmed about it. If you were recruited by one of our members, who was it? Coop. Why do you want to join the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion? I like the Marines and this is a good opportunity to learn the game better. Do you understand the definition of realism gaming according to the 3d MRB and willing to abide by this game style? Yes. Do you understand this unit is EST(GMT -5) time zoned based. Operations take place on Saturday at 1800 EST and Sunday at 2000 EST. Yes.

Mr Arch, Your application has been accepted and you have been processed as 0372 Critical Skills Operator. Within the next hour, you will receive new forum permissions which will grant you access to the Welcome Aboard section where there are instructions to get you set up with our modpack. Your next step is to report for In-Processing. This verifies that you can connect to our server and prepares you for attending your first operation with a team. If your mods are installed correctly, it should only take about 20 minutes. You will then begin Assessment & Selection by attending the next available Operation for the team you wish to join. You will be attached to the headquarters element and will be guided through the operation by them. After completing the operation you will report for A&S Phase 2 where any tactical deficiencies will be corrected. If you have prior Military or MilSim experience and are found to be tactically proficient in the required areas, you will skip the second phase of A&S. If the Team HQ feels you are a good fit, you will then be selected and will complete your training with your new team. In Summary: Step 1. Review Welcome Aboard message and follow the Instructions. Step 2. Report for In-Processing. Thank you and once again, welcome, Private. Respectfully Submitted, HMC (FMF) Roe S-1 Chief

Collateral Damage in the Desert: Civilians Pay the Price of America’s War The smoke had barely cleared when villagers near Mheiriz discovered the bodies. Among them were men known not as fighters, but as farmers — unarmed, caught in the blast radius of what locals insist was an American airstrike. Grain sacks lay scattered among the rubble, a bitter symbol of lives cut short while tending the land. In the dusty market square, grief turned to anger. Only hours earlier, American troops operating under the banner of “counter-insurgency” demolished a local shop said to have been frequented by ordinary families. Residents describe it as nothing more than a place to buy bread, oil, and tea. Its blackened walls now stand as stark testimony to what they call the indifference of foreign soldiers toward Sahrawi lives. A typical local market in western sahara For the Polisario Front, these incidents are not isolated accidents. They are the predictable outcome of a campaign that labels resistance as terrorism and dismisses local suffering as the price of “stability.” “Every bomb dropped, every shop destroyed, every farmer killed — it only proves what we have always said,” a Polisario representative in Tindouf declared. “The United States fights not for peace, but to keep Morocco’s grip on our homeland.” Washington insists its operations target armed insurgents, not civilians. But on the ground, the distinction is lost in the dust. For the families burying their dead, the argument rings hollow. In refugee camps and villages alike, the message spreads: America has chosen sides, and the Sahrawi people — once promised self-determination — are now treated as collateral in someone else’s war. As images of shattered fields and ruined storefronts circulate online, the Polisario claims momentum not from battlefield victories alone, but from what they see as growing proof that U.S. intervention deepens, rather than resolves, the suffering in Western Sahara.

Transcript Call start: 19:24:31 Local Time Caller: Uzbin Hydroelectric plant, overseers office, emergency line Receiver: Operator 044, Royal Gendarmerie station Uzbin Operator: 117 Royal Gendarmerie, what is the situation? Caller: *Muffled sounds of gunfire* Yes Hello Im *Unintelligible, more muffled sounds of gunfire* Overseer of the Uzbin Hydro *Unintelligible* Under attack *Unintelligible* guardposts overrun and armed men are rounding up my workers *Unintelligible, muffled explosion* Send help, police, army, anyth… *Call disconnected* Transcript Call start: 19:26:12 Local Time Caller: Operator 044, Royal Gendarmerie station Uzbin Receiver: Uzbin Regional Royal Gendarmerie Commander’s office, Emergency line. Receiver: Yes!? Caller: 044 reporting, Red River, Red River, Red River Reciever: Understood *Call disconnected* Transcript Call start: 19:27:02 Local Time Caller: Uzbin Regional Royal Gendarmerie Commander’s office, Emergency line. Receiver: Special purpose contact “ROUNDTABLE” *REDACTED* *Call disconnected*

WARNING ORDER MSOT 8312 VIKING SITUATION: The Moroccan Army has faced stiff resistance in their recent offensive against the Polisario Front. Moroccan high command is unwilling to bring overwhelming firepower to bear against an AO that still contains many non-combatants and has requested US support on the ground. A Co 3d MRB will conduct a series of raids against known insurgent strongholds IOT further ours and the Royal Moroccan army's understanding of the opposition in this AO ENEMY: The main OPFOR in this AO are Polisario Front forces. This insurgent group has made extensive use of hit-and-run tactics, as well as ditching equipment and attempting to blend in with the civilian populace. Force size, equipment, and exact tactics are unknown at this time. FRIENDLY: 16th Mechanized Brigade of the Royal Moroccan Army ODA 0111, A Co. 1st Btn. 10th SFG 160th SOAR MISSION: OBJ HAM SANDWICH has been identified as an insurgent hideout. Long abandoned, the 3 compounds have seen a renewed surge in activity with the start of the Moroccan offensive. OBJ HAM SANDWICH is believed to be an overnight safehouse for insurgents and weapons trafficking. Taking this OBJ may net significant intel in how the Polisario front operates. MSOT 8312 will Conduct a raid on OBJ HAM SANDWICH 160th SOAR will Coordinate air support with MSOT 8312 COMMANDERS INTENT: Seize OBJ HAM SANDWICH Detain any personel Conduct SSE in order to enhance the Task Forces understanding of Polisario Front assets in the region Hold OBJ HAM SANDWICH until relieved at approx. 21:40 Local time. RECONNAISSANCE: OBJ HAM SANDWICH, drone images, 2 hours old WEATHER: Clear Sky 21:00 Local Time. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT N/A SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS N/A Code Words SHATTER: Sending station is combat ineffective. HAVOC: Comms compromised, scramble comms. END WARNING ORDER

HUMINT LEAD PACKET — SULTANS WRATH (Derived from D-01 / D-02) Classification: SECRET – Operational Use Only Date: June 26, 2025 Prepared by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence HET / Intel Cell 1) Executive Summary Two detainees provided partial, evasive testimony. Key HUMINT leads: (1) an operational commander known as “Youssef,” (2) a probable insider leak in Laayoune, (3) foreign-sourced explosives (Russian/Cyrillic packaging), and (4) persistent rumors that Youssef once trained with U.S. forces during an exchange/liaison program while serving in the Algerian army. This last point, while unverified, could explain his familiarity with U.S. convoy doctrine and counter-ambush drills. 2) Source Reliability & Assessment D-01 (25–30, low-level fighter): Low reliability; evasive, confrontational, ideological focus. Provided general admissions (wall charges, ambush structure) but no specifics. D-02 (35–40, senior fighter/driver): Medium reliability; combative but more informative. Confirmed “Youssef” as commander, referenced foreign-sourced explosives, alluded to IMET/TSCTP training. Both detainees corroborate: Ambush executed with professional-level discipline. Familiarity with U.S. convoy tactics. Ideological framing of U.S. as enabling Moroccan suppression of Sahrawi people. 3) Key HUMINT Leads “Youssef” — Ambush Commander Nom de guerre; reportedly ex-Algerian army officer. Detainees allege exposure to U.S.-funded training programs (possibly IMET, TSCTP). Tactical impact: likely source of OPFOR knowledge of herringbone dispersal and convoy SOP exploitation. Priority: High — identification, service history, training records verification. Insider leak — Laayoune Both detainees claim Moroccan officials compromised convoy route. Priority: High — CI investigation to identify personnel with access to ministerial movement data. Explosives & logistics Wall charges of probable foreign origin (Russian/Cyrillic markings). Priority: Medium — forensic analysis, trace supply networks. Ideological motivation & propaganda Detainees frame U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression. Use of interrogations to reinforce narrative of righteous struggle. Priority: Medium — assess messaging impact on local recruitment or morale. OPFOR tactics & discipline Execution of L-shaped ambush, coordinated flanking, timed withdrawal demonstrates high-level tactical proficiency. Priority: Medium — assess training source, replication risk, countermeasures. 4) Corroboration & Collection Requirements CI / HUMINT: Confirm “Youssef” identity and IMET/TSCTP training participation. Investigate Laayoune administrative leak — transport/protocol offices. Interview refugee camp sources for confirmation of leadership identity and prior Algerian service. Forensics / Technical Exploitation: Examine wall charges and blast residue for origin and supply-chain links. SIGINT / IMINT: Review communications around Smara ambush. Monitor suspected staging areas, safehouses, and vehicle movements. Open-source / Liaison: Check IMET / TSCTP training rosters (2000–2015) for Algerian officers matching “Youssef.” Leverage partner intelligence for corroboration without tipping detainee-derived leads. 5) Analyst Comment The detainees’ combative and ideological framing indicates OPFOR confidence and attempts to psychologically challenge U.S. moral authority. The rumor of U.S. training (IMET/TSCTP) is consistent with historical programs and could explain the precision exploitation of U.S. convoy SOPs. Insider leaks from Laayoune remain a probable operational vulnerability. OPFOR demonstrates professional-level small-unit tactics, suggesting foreign or institutional training exposure. Counterintelligence priority: Confirm “Youssef” identity and training background; neutralize leadership node to disrupt operational cohesion. 6) Immediate Recommendations Re-interrogate D-02 to focus specifically on: IMET/TSCTP training timeline and Youssef’s role in Algerian military. Names, locations, or facilitators of Laayoune leaks. Forensic / SIGINT coordination: Trace explosives, validate supply lines, monitor communications. CI Measures: Audit Moroccan channels for potential insider leaks; implement protective protocols for convoy planning. Source Development: Expand HUMINT coverage in refugee camps and local populations to corroborate leadership structure and past foreign exposure. 7) Risk Assessment Operational Security: OPFOR has high situational awareness and is ideologically motivated; detainee compartmentalization likely protects leadership. Counterintelligence Exposure: IMET/TSCTP alumni could represent doctrinal vulnerability if confirmed. Psychological Influence: Detainees actively seek to frame U.S. involvement as morally compromised, potentially affecting local perception and recruitment.

INTERROGATION TRANSCRIPT — DETAINEES CAPTURED BY MSOT 8311 SULTANS WRATH 01-25 Classification: SECRET – HUMINT / Operational Use Only Date: 24–25 June 2025 Location: COP Atlas, Western Sahara AO Conducted by: 3dMRB S-2 Intelligence, HUMINT Collection Team Session 1: Detainee D-01 Profile: Male, approx. 25–30, Polisario fighter. Disposition: Aggressive, confrontational. Q: Who commanded the ambush? A: “Command? You think we need your ranks, your shiny uniforms and papers? We fight because we must. Every man in that desert knows his duty. One day our people will be free, inshallah.” Q: Who is "Youssef"? (NOTE: Suspected nom de guerre of OPFOR Commander - collected through SIGINT during Sultans Wrath 01-25) A: [leans forward] “Youssef fights for our people, not for a king who sells the land to foreigners. He fought before, he fights with his people now. That is all you need to know.” Q: Three US diplomats are dead. How did your people know the convoy’s route? A: “The minister travels with your diplomats, thinking the desert belongs to Rabat and Washington. Everyone knows your patterns. The sand speaks, and so do greedy traitors in Morocco’s offices. They would sell their mother for the right price.” Q: Your people executed a textbook L-shape ambush. Where did that training come from? A: [smirks] “From watching you. From your manuals, your arrogance. You taught Algeria, and now your lessons come back at you. You gave us the tools, and we sharpened them.” Q: Did Youssef train with U.S. forces? A: “Maybe he trained in Algeria, maybe in your own bases. Does it sting to know your own programs make us stronger?” — End Session. D-01 repeatedly frames U.S. as an occupier’s enabler, defiant and ideological. Provided no direct admissions, but confirmed awareness of U.S.-Algerian training links. Session 2: Detainee D-02 Profile: Male, approx. 35–40, senior Polisario fighter. Disposition: Cold, combative but more measured. Q: Who led your ambush? A: “I will only answer if you promise to not hand me over to the Morrocans. They do not treat their prisoners well. My brother has been missing for 15 years." Q: We can't promise you that. The more you cooperate the better your chances are at remaining in US custody. A: “Truthfulness leads to righteousness, and righteousness leads to Paradise.” [Note: later identified as a muslim proverb] "Call him Youssef. I suspect you already know the name. He is Sahrawi in heart, Algerian in past. He has seen your soldiers up close — maybe even wore your patch for a time. Does that frighten you?” Q: Was he part of Algerian army training with the U.S.? A: “Your country trained many in Algiers. You sent officers, you taught convoy drills, counter-terror. You thought they would fight your wars. Instead they fight ours. You cannot undo that.” Q: How was the convoy compromised? A: “Do you think Morocco keeps secrets? Their officials sell them for money, for favors. Your people trust a rotten house, then wonder why the roof falls.” Q: Where are your explosives coming from? A: “From friends who still believe we are more than shadows. The crates had cyrillc writing, but the fire is Sahrawi. You cannot stop it.” Q: What is your objective with these attacks? A: [raises voice] “Our objective? Freedom! The same word your country claims to live by. But you arm the king and call us terrorists. We are the Sahrawi people, and until the last camp in Tindouf is empty, until the wall falls, we will fight — with your tactics if we must, against your allies if we must.” — End Session. D-02 provided sharper ideological justification, acknowledged possible IMET/TSCTP exposure indirectly, and deliberately positioned U.S. as complicit in Sahrawi oppression. HUMINT Exploitation Notes Both detainees leveraged interrogation to push a political narrative and not a religious one, positioning U.S. as an enabler of Moroccan oppression. Deep seated religious beliefs remain however a factor. References to IMET and TSCTP were made indirectly, framed as proof that U.S. training seeded their tactical proficiency. Youssef possibly identified as ex-Algerian army with foreign training exposure; detainees deliberately taunted U.S. interrogators with this fact. High ideological motivation: detainees more concerned with message projection than self-preservation.

Rabat, Algiers, Washington: The Dangerous Geometry of an Old War On a dusty highway south of Smara, what at first appeared to be another skirmish in a forgotten conflict may quickly escalate into a crisis with international ramifications. A convoy carrying Morocco’s Minister of the Interior was ambushed by armed separatists from the Polisario Front. The Minister survived with minor injuries. But among the dead were three American State Department officials traveling alongside him — an outcome that has turned a long-frozen dispute into an urgent matter of U.S. foreign policy. The site of the ambush on the Minister of the Interior. The Western Sahara has been at the center of Moroccan-Algerian rivalry for nearly half a century. After Spain’s withdrawal in 1975, Morocco annexed the territory, sparking a protracted guerrilla war with the Polisario Front, which had proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Algeria, emerging as a revolutionary republic and regional counterweight to Morocco’s monarchy, became the Polisario’s primary backer, offering arms, training, and sanctuary. Though the 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire halted open hostilities, the promise of a referendum on self-determination never materialized. The conflict settled into a “frozen” state, punctuated by sporadic clashes and diplomatic jousting. Rabat consolidated its control over most of the territory, building a vast sand berm fortified by mines and surveillance, while the Polisario maintained its base in Tindouf, Algeria. For decades, the United States kept a cautious distance, balancing support for Morocco’s monarchy with the principle of self-determination. That equilibrium broke after the recent attack, claiming the lives of three US dignitaries. That is when President Moore formally recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The move cements Morocco’s position but leaves Algeria and the Polisario more isolated than ever. Within hours of the ambush, Washington declared its “unwavering solidarity” with Rabat and signaled expanded cooperation on counterinsurgency. Joint intelligence-sharing, aerial surveillance, and even the deployment of U.S. military advisors are under discussion. This represents more than retaliation. Morocco has long presented itself to Washington as a linchpin in the struggle against jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel — a region where state authority crumbles under the advance of groups linked to al-Qaida, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State. By framing the Polisario’s actions as part of this broader instability, Rabat has successfully aligned its territorial ambitions with U.S. strategic concerns. Three US dignitaries were killed during the ambush. In Morocco, officials were quick to implicate Algeria. “This attack could not have been carried out without Algerian support,” declared a government spokesman, hinting at intelligence coordination behind the ambush. While direct evidence remains elusive, Washington’s conspicuous silence has been interpreted as tacit acceptance of Rabat’s narrative. For Algiers, the accusation is dangerous. Algeria remains Europe’s third-largest supplier of natural gas and has cultivated ties with Moscow, Beijing, and increasingly Ankara. Yet its rivalry with Morocco, sharpened by closed borders and military build-up on both sides, remains central to its foreign policy. Open confrontation, however, risks entangling Algeria in a conflict it may not wish to escalate — particularly given its fragile domestic politics and economic dependence on energy exports. For Morocco’s monarchy, the ambush offers a grim but potent political dividend. It reinforces nationalist calls for a “final settlement” of the Western Sahara issue, while international sympathy strengthens Rabat’s claim that the Polisario are no longer freedom fighters but terrorists destabilizing the Maghreb. Yet the implications extend beyond Moroccan domestic politics. A deeper U.S. footprint in North Africa risks transforming a regional rivalry into a broader geopolitical contest. Russia, already Algeria’s arms supplier, may seize the opportunity to tighten its influence. The European Union, dependent on Algerian gas but also invested in stability along the Mediterranean as part of it's immigration policies, faces renewed pressure to balance between two adversaries. A checkpoint allegedly manned by Polisario Front separatists. Amid this diplomatic maneuvering, the Sahrawi people themselves remain trapped in limbo. Tens of thousands still live in refugee camps around Tindouf, their lives suspended between exile and unfulfilled promises of self-determination. For them, the ambush may be seen as an act of resistance, a desperate attempt to reinsert their cause into a world that has largely relegated it to the margins. Yet as the violence escalates, their political agency risks being subsumed by great power rivalry. The ambush near Smara was not only a violent strike against a ministerial convoy. It was a moment that redefined alliances and hardened fault lines in the Maghreb. By drawing Washington directly into the conflict, it has transformed a decades-long stalemate into a potential flashpoint of international confrontation. A sahrawi refugee camp run by IDAP Whether this alignment brings stability through Moroccan strength or deepens instability by provoking Algerian retaliation remains uncertain. What is clear is that the Western Sahara — long treated as a forgotten corner of postcolonial politics — may become a stage where local grievances and global rivalries collide. Editorial: Toward a New Proxy War? The ambush in Western Sahara that killed three American officials and nearly claimed the life of Morocco’s Minister of the Interior is more than an escalation of a long-frozen conflict. It is a warning: the Maghreb risks becoming the next proxy battlefield of global politics. The outlines of this new confrontation are already visible. Washington, having recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, now doubles down with promises of counterinsurgency support. Rabat, emboldened, portrays separatists not as a political movement but as “terrorists” threatening regional stability. Algiers, meanwhile, entrenched in its historic support for the Polisario Front, leans ever more heavily on Moscow and Beijing for diplomatic and military backing. What is at stake is not simply the future of the Sahrawi people — exiled in camps, divided by a fortified berm, and abandoned by the promises of international law. It is the transformation of their struggle into a pawn on the chessboard of global rivalry. Just as Afghanistan once stood at the intersection of Cold War strategies, Western Sahara now risks being cast in the role of proxy battlefield, where local grievances serve as the fuel for distant ambitions. Europe, caught between dependence on Algerian gas and security cooperation with Morocco, will be forced into contradictions it cannot easily reconcile. The Sahel, already destabilized by armed groups, may see its crises compounded by this new polarization. And the Sahrawi, who once hoped for self-determination under the auspices of the United Nations, are now consigned to invisibility, their future traded between power blocs. The United States may believe it is securing stability by binding itself to Rabat. Algeria may believe it is defending a principle by sustaining the Polisario. Both are mistaken. What they risk creating is yet another arena where the grievances of a marginalized people are subsumed into a geopolitical contest whose costs will be borne not in Washington or Algiers, but in the refugee camps of Tindouf and the contested streets of Laayoune. If the international community allows Western Sahara to become the next proxy war, it will not only betray the Sahrawi people — it will add yet another chapter to the long history of conflicts where global powers fight by proxy, and local populations pay the price. Revue Diplomatique Rachid Benyamina – North Africa and Sahel specialist

When Protocol Collides with Power: A Diplomatic Misstep in Washington Washington’s quiet summer night was interrupted not by an international crisis in the usual sense, but by a seemingly banal traffic incident. Yet, in the space of a few hours, it evolved into a textbook example of how fragile the choreography of diplomacy can be. The principal actor: Crown Prince Moulay Idris El Mansour of Morocco, heir to a monarchy that remains one of the United States’ most reliable partners in North Africa. The episode unfolded in the streets of Georgetown, where the Prince’s convoy allegedly brushed against another vehicle. While no injuries were reported, the interaction between the Prince’s security detail and the Metropolitan Police quickly descended into confusion. Officers, unbriefed on the presence of a foreign royal with full diplomatic immunity, attempted to question — and, according to witnesses, briefly restrain — a member of the entourage. Passerby footage of the diplomatic faux-pas was posted online. Here, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 should have acted as the invisible script, ensuring the encounter concluded without incident. Instead, a lack of familiarity with its provisions exposed the limits of protocol training in local law enforcement. In Rabat, the Royal Cabinet responded within hours. Its communiqué spoke of “regrettable treatment” and “the erosion of mutual respect.” The language was restrained but unmistakable — a signal that even an incident without physical harm could register as a breach of the delicate balance that underpins bilateral ties. The United States, conscious of Morocco’s role as a linchpin in regional security — from counterterrorism cooperation in the Sahel to mediation in the Western Sahara dispute — moved swiftly. A senior delegation from the State Department will travel to Rabat in the coming days to offer what officials term “clarification and reaffirmation.” This rush to mend fences is not mere courtesy. Morocco occupies a strategic crossroads: an interlocutor between Arab, African, and Western spheres; a monarchy that has navigated upheavals in the region without succumbing to them. For Washington, any fissure in this relationship could reverberate through trade agreements, military cooperation, and shared intelligence frameworks. The Crown Prince himself has remained silent, leaving his image to be shaped by photographs of a smiling departure from Dulles International Airport. Whether this smile signals magnanimity or calculated restraint is a matter for speculation. “Seeing you smile, I know immediately that you are dwelling in awareness. Keep this smile always blooming, the half-smile of a Buddha.” In the end, the episode is a reminder that diplomacy is not only conducted in summits and communiqués. It can just as easily hinge on a street corner, in the span of minutes, when the symbolic weight of a crown meets the procedural blind spots of a capital city. Revue Diplomatique Rachid Benyamina – North Africa and Sahel specialist

Joint US-Venezuelan operation captures notorious warcriminal. With official US involvement in stabilization efforts following the Venezuelan civil war confirmed ADANews has been given exclusive insight into some of the more sensitive parts of this operation. While images of US Marines guarding humanitarian supply posts and patroling major Venezuelan cities have been flooding social media in recent days, in the background more clandestine missions are carried out. American special forces have been conducting a large scale manhunt for a number of high profile members of the fallen Maduro regime. Some of these people have surrendered themselves to SUG forces but many more have fled into the more remote parts of the country along with the remnants of the former Venezuelan army. As a journalist for ADANews I was granted a rare permission to accompany US forces on one of these missions. I was taken blindfolded in a car to a remote staging area where I was intorduced to several masked and armed men. The men were identified simply as "Team Black" and "Team Green". It was explained to me that "Team Green" was the first unit in a program by the new Venezuelan government to build a western style special forces unit and "Team Black" was responsible for training and advising this unit. I was not informed what US Unit "Team Black" was part of. I was allowed to sit in on the teams briefing but was not allowed any camera or recording equipment. The plan layed out was a bold one and bordered on foolish. A daring raid against a townhouse in a remote village in broad daylight. One of the Venezuelan soldiers questioned why it would be done during daytime and the reson given was that the target was most likely not planning an overnight stay. The team had to go now, or be forced to wait until the next opportunity. The soldier seemed content with that reply. The target of the raid was one "Brigadier General Ernesto Molina". A man responsible for multiple terror campaigns again dissenting elements within Venezuela both before and during the civil war. The trip to the remote village took place in unmarked Toyota Landcruisers, as one of the soldiers put it: "If we roll in with big, lumbering military vehicles the rebels just run and hide in the jungle". The trip took no more than 20 minutes and when we arrived at the village the soldiers quickly lept out of the vehicles and surrounded what they had called "the target building". Three armed men came out on the building porch and were immedietly gunned down. The soldiers then stormed the building using a sledgehammer to break open the front door. I was left alone with the vehicles for about 5 minutes during which no gunfire was heard. After 5 minutes had passed the soldiers came back out with a handcuffed man and I was permitted to take one picture of the group before quickly being bundled back into the vehicles and driven back to the base we came from. Ernesto Molina was escorted away from the vehicles and into a different house. All my camera and recording equipment were seized by "Team Black" and only returned to me 2 days later having been "sanitized" Team Black and Team Green with the captured Brigadier General Molina Simon Tam War Correspondent ADANews

WARNING ORDER MSOT 8313 Hades SITUATION: With the collapse of the Venezuelan loyalist forces and the consolidation of the SUG forces across the North of the country, most direct engagements have ended with conventional forces. However, there are still pockets of loyalist resistance, and they appear to be attempting to establish an insurgency. SUG forces have been recognized as the legitimate government, but since they are overstretched attempting to solidify their new position, they have requested aid. Washington has agreed to help and is deploying us as advisors and support personnel to bolster the new Venezuelan forces. Use of identifiable markers for US personnel are now required and given our new role, we are not authorized to engage unless fired upon, unless explicitly instructed otherwise. ENEMY: The main OPFOR in this AO are the remnants of Loyalist units that were defeated conventionally and are now attempting to fight an insurgency. Force size, equipment, and exact tactics are unknown at this time. Expect normal insurgent actions. FRIENDLY: Venezuelan SUG forces. Note: SUG forces have not yet been able to provide uniforms for all its soldiers. Expect some degree of variation and even civilian clothing in some cases. MISSION: MSOT 8313 will Link up with friendly forces and escort them with MRAPs to OBJ GULL Be ready for possible further tasking 160th SOAR will Support MSOT 8313 Be ready for possible further tasking COMMANDERS INTENT: Provide deterrence against any attempt to hinder SUG forces moving South RECONNAISSANCE: The accuracy of enemy positions along the front lines is based on possibly outdated intel given the fluid situation, and it should not be heavily relied upon. 8313 AO WEATHER: Rainy 11NOV24 IU 12:00 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT M-ATVs, SLAT Armor kit. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ROE: 1. Do not fire unless hostile intent is shown. (Pointing weapons in your direction, maneuvering on your position, attempting to interfere with the convoy) 2. Armed civilians will be present in your AO, they are not to be engaged unless displaying hostile intent. 3. SHOUT, SHOW, SHOOT (Warning shots should be attempted but we recognize that this may not always be practical when faced with speeding vehicles and poor sightlines. Attempting to disable vehicles is preferable to killing the driver) 4. Respect civilian property (Minimize use of HE in and around structures whenever possible) 5. No entry in this ROE should be interpreted as forcing you to endanger your team needlessly. Exercise sound judgement at all times. Code Words SHATTER: Sending station is combat ineffective. HAVOC: Comms compromised, scramble comms. END WARNING ORDER

Decided to update this again. The calendar now includes the fifth weekends aswell as the updated OP and training times/days for Hades and Viking. Feel free to do with the calendar as you please. LINK TO CALENDER

WARNING ORDER MSOT 8311 Legion SITUATION: The situation in Venezuela has only further deteriorated, turning into an all-out civil war. While most of the Venezuelan armed forces remained loyal to Caracas and President Maduro, some did break away, and many ad-hoc militias have formed. Officially, while the United States has recognized the opposition group's Salvation Unity Government (SUG) as the legitimate government of Venezuela, we are not to engage any Venezuelan forces outside of a 4km exclusion zone from the San Antero Port. However, Washington has concluded that the SUG will not last long without support. As such, we have been ordered to provide clandestine support for the SUG forces outside of the exclusion zone. All ground forces are to ensure that there are no identifiable markings on their person that can tie them back to US military forces while deployed outside of the exclusion zone. ENEMY: The main OPFOR in this AO are elements of the 12th Caribbean Ranger, 13th Infantry, and 14th Mechanized Infantry Brigades, of the 1st Infantry Division of the Venezuelan Army, and the Venezuelan Air Force is theoretically capable of responding within 30 mins. The 1st Infantry is a combined arms mechanized force with BMP-3s, BTR-80As, T-72B1s, and artillery support, with light airmobile forces reported nearby. FRIENDLY: Arlington Amphibious Ready Group (USS Arlington, USS Tripoli, USS Liberty, and USS John Basilone) 15th MEU Venezuelan Opposition (SUG) forces MISSION: MSOT 8311 will Deliver arms to SUG forces at OBJ CONTRAS in preparation for their assault on a nearby Loyalist base Attack OBJ POWDER in conjunction with SUG forces and suppress the mortars there Ambush any airmobile QRF attempting to come in from the NW Be ready for possible further tasking 160th SOAR will Support MSOT 8311 Be ready for possible further tasking COMMANDERS INTENT: Support SUG forces with weapons deliveries and eliminate Loyalist forces at OBJ POWDER, as well as ambushing any QRFs. RECONNAISSANCE: The accuracy of enemy positions along the front lines is based on possibly outdated intel given the fluid situation, and it should not be heavily relied upon. 8311 AO OBJ CONTRAS OBJ POWDER The OBJ is a Loyalist mortar base that is capable of suppressing the SUG attack to the South WEATHER: Clear 02OCT24 IU 03:00 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT Only OPFOR-style weaponry is allowed outside the exclusion zone SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS N/A Code Words SHATTER: Sending station is combat ineffective. HAVOC: Comms compromised, scramble comms. END WARNING ORDER

U.S. Establishes Humanitarian Safe Zone Amid Escalating Venezuelan Crisis Venezuela has plunged into a full-scale civil war, with violent clashes erupting between government forces loyal to President Nicolás Maduro and a coalition of rebel factions demanding democratic reforms. The conflict has engulfed major cities, including Caracas, Maracaibo, and Valencia, leading to widespread destruction and a mounting humanitarian crisis. In response to the escalating violence and deteriorating humanitarian conditions, the United States has established a humanitarian safe zone near the city of San Antero. This zone aims to provide refuge for civilians fleeing the conflict and to facilitate the delivery of essential aid. The U.S. military, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, is overseeing the operation, ensuring the safe passage of displaced individuals and the distribution of food, water, and medical supplies. The relief effort also includes the hospitalship USNS Comfort off the coast of Venezuela. The U.S. Department of State has issued a Level 4 "Do Not Travel" advisory for Venezuela, citing extreme risks including wrongful detention, torture, kidnapping, arbitrary law enforcement, escalating crime, civil unrest, and unreliable healthcare. The advisory urges all U.S. citizens to avoid travel to Venezuela and recommends that those currently in the country depart immediately. President Maduro's government has condemned the U.S. intervention, labeling it a violation of Venezuela's sovereignty. In a televised address, Maduro accused the United States of orchestrating a coup and called on loyalist forces to defend the nation against foreign aggression. The international community remains deeply divided over the crisis. While some nations support the establishment of the humanitarian zone as a necessary measure to alleviate civilian suffering, others view it as an infringement on Venezuela's territorial integrity. The United Nations has called for an immediate ceasefire and urged all parties to engage in dialogue to resolve the conflict peacefully. As the situation continues to evolve, the humanitarian toll is expected to rise, with thousands of Venezuelans seeking refuge in neighboring countries. The global community watches with growing concern, hoping for a swift resolution to the conflict and the restoration of peace in Venezuela. Linda Williams Grand Central Times THIS IS A WORK OF FICTION TO FURTHER THE STORYLINE OF THE 3d MRB ARMA MILSIM UNIT.